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Punishing the Innocent
Josh Bowers∗
ABSTRACT
Scholars highlight an “innocence problem” as one of plea bargaining’s chief failures.
Their concerns, however, are misguided. In fact, many innocent defendants are far better
off in a world with plea bargaining than without. Plea bargaining is not the cause of
wrongful punishment. Rather, inaccurate guilty pleas are merely symptomatic of errors
at the points of arrest, charge, and/or trial. Much of the worry over an innocence problem
proceeds from misperceptions over (i) the characteristics of typical innocent defendants,
(ii) the types of cases they generally face, and (iii) the level of due process they ordinarily
desire. In reality, most innocent defendants are recidivists, because institutional biases
select for the arrest and charge of these repeat players. And most cases are petty. In these
low-stakes cases, recidivist innocent defendants face high pretrial process costs (particularly if they are detained). But innocent defendants also enjoy low plea prices, because
prosecutors ultimately prioritize work avoidance over sentence maximization. Moreover,
defendants possess certain underappreciated bargaining advantages in these low-stakes
cases. In the end, the costs of proceeding to trial often swamp the costs of pleading to lenient bargains. Put differently, many recidivist innocent defendants are punished by process and released by plea. Thus, plea bargaining is no source of wrongful punishment;
rather, it is a normative good that may cut punishment short, and (for the innocent at
least) less punishment is a net positive. Accordingly, the system must provide innocent
defendants access to plea bargaining. Current vehicles for rational choice pleas—like nocontest pleas and equivocal pleas—are not up to the task. Instead, the system should reconceive of false pleas as legal fictions and require defense lawyers to advise and assist
innocent defendants who wish to enter into plea bargains and mouth dishonest on-therecord words of guilt.
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Punishing the Innocent
Josh Bowers
INTRODUCTION
Much has been made of an “innocence problem” in plea bargaining.1 Even
scholars who view plea bargaining as systemically positive nevertheless propose
reforms to limit access to the factually guilty only.2 But the conventional view is
wrong. On balance, plea bargaining is a categorical good for many innocent defendants, particularly in low-stakes cases.
No doubt punishment of the innocent is a tragedy and a failure. But inaccurate guilty pleas are merely symptomatic of errors at the points of arrest,
charge, and/or trial—not at the point of plea bargaining. The relevant pleabargaining question is only how bad the failure will be—how great the tragedy.
From that understanding, the inescapable, if seemingly unsavory, ultimate conclusion is that many innocent defendants are far better off in a world with plea
bargaining than without.
For the typical innocent defendant in the typical case—which I demonstrate is a recidivist facing petty charges—the best resolution is generally a quick
plea in exchange for a light bargained-for sentence. And such a plea is frequently
1 See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1382-83 (2003);
Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1321, 1336
(2003); Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1, 42 (2001); John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 444-52 (2001); Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REV.
485, 494 (2000); Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1363, 1363-64, 1384 (2000); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1121, 1151 (1998); David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 115, 132 (1994); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster,
101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1992 (1992) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Disaster]; Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, HASTINGS L. REV. 957, 986-90 (1989); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 52 (1988)
[hereinafter, Schulhofer, Regulatory System]; Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal
Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931,
932-34 (1983); John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88 (1977); Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 97-100 (1976).
2 See H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE 191-92 (1996); Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on
Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295 (2006) (proposing screening model to limit plea bargaining to guilty only); Oren Gazal-Ayal & Oren Bar-Gill, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. &
ECON. 353 (2006) (same); Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process
in Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REV. 887, 894, 924 (1980) (“[P]lea bargaining is constitutionally
defensible [but] demands the development of guidelines expressly designed to ensure that the incremental inaccuracy of plea bargaining does not exceed the limits tolerated by procedural due
process.”).
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available, because prosecutors do not try to maximize sentences in low-stakes
cases, and, in any event, defendants possess certain underappreciated bargaining
advantages in those cases. Finally, even for innocent defendants facing more serious charges, plea bargaining may be, at a minimum, the manifestly least-bad
option.
In making these claims, I do not wish to enter the larger debate over plea
bargaining.3 Specifically, I do not address many of the numerous and weighty
objections to the practice.4 My position is far more modest: I seek only to demonstrate that the conventional criticism—that there is an innocence problem in plea
bargaining—is off the mark. Whatever else might be said of plea bargaining, discounts that permit the innocent to end cases on defendant-optimal terms are no
source of lament and no persuasive weapon in the arsenal of the anti-bargaining
camp. Rather, these great discounts for innocent defendants are facets of plea
bargaining that may recommend the practice—at least in low-stakes cases. As
such, viable bargaining outlets should exist for the innocent.
There is little new to the observation that guilty pleas may prove attractive to the innocent.5 But I intend to do more. I intend to mount a coordinated
normative defense of the practice for the innocent, pinpointing which innocent
defendants draw the most benefit from plea bargaining and in what types of
cases. In doing so, I rely on well-developed literature concerning process costs
and prosecutors’ bargaining incentives, but I also bring fresh perspective to the
scholarship by focusing on two underappreciated aspects of plea bargaining for
the innocent: (i) that innocent defendants are probably recidivists facing petty
charges, and (ii) that even in the face of agency failure defendants possess certain
bargaining advantages over prosecutors in low-stakes cases. I then raise a novel
challenge to the much-maligned quasi-available current channels for rationalchoice pleas—i.e., equivocal and no-contest pleas. Specifically, I challenge these
pleas not because—as the typical complaint goes—they facilitate guilty pleas for
the innocent, but rather because they do not make these false pleas easy or equitable enough. Finally, I offer a practical proposal to re-conceive of false pleas as
legal fictions and to require defense lawyers to advise and assist innocent defenFor a pithy, yet comprehensive, summary of plea bargaining’s perceived ills, see Alschuler,
supra note 1, at 932-34. For some of the strongest critiques of the practice, see, e.g., Id.; Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note 1; John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
3 (1978). For some of the strongest (at least partial) support, see, e.g., See Scott & Stuntz, supra
note 5; Frank H. Easterbrook, supra note 5; Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice”, 13 L. & SOC. REV. 509 (1979).
4 Indeed, I credit a number of these objections but stress that they have nothing to do with
innocence. See, e.g., infra notes 77, 203-215, 241-242 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., UVILLER, supra note 2, at 192; Douglass, supra note 1 at 448 n.43; Robert E. Scott
& William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1934 (1992); McMunigal,
supra note 1, at 989-90; Alschuler, supra note 1, at 951; Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Justice
as a Market System, 12 J. LEG. STUD. 289, 320 (1983); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s
Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L. J. 1179, 1278-1306 (1975) [hereinafter Alschuler, Defense
Role].
3
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dants who wish to mouth dishonest on-the-record words of guilt. These are my
principal contributions.6
Much of the worry over an innocence problem in plea bargaining proceeds
from misperceptions over (i) the characteristics of typical innocent defendants, (ii)
the types of cases they generally face, and (iii) the level of due process they typically desire. First, most innocent defendants are probably recidivists. These repeat players are the principal target population of police activities and investigations. And, as such, they are more likely to be caught erroneously in miscast or
too-wide police nets.7 As recidivists, they face unique burdens when challenging
false charges, but—perhaps counter-intuitively—enjoy concurrent unique pleabargaining benefits. On the burden side, they are more likely to be charged
and/or indicted post-arrest and less likely to have pending charges dismissed,
even where evidence is weak.8 Additionally, they are more likely to face pretrial
detention and are less able to adequately fight their cases at trial.9 On the benefits side, recidivists suffer less—if at all—from the corollary consequences of convictions.10

6 Professors Alschuler, Scott, and Stuntz have devoted the most rigorous and considered attention to bargaining benefits for the innocent. Alschuler, in particular, made a number of similar points but used them as ammunition against plea bargaining generally. See, e.g., Alschuler,
Defense Role, supra note 5, at 1278-1306. Conversely, I take these points—and others that Alschuler did not make—as positive attributes of the practice. For instance, I reach different conclusions concerning the value of equivocal-versus-false pleas and the consequences of imperfect
agency in low-stakes cases. Compare Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1182-94, 1201-03 (worrying that
agency failure leads innocent defendants to strike ill-advised bargains); Albert W. Alschuler,
Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1412-1424 (2003) (favoring equivocal pleas as means to allow innocent to plead
guilty honestly) [hereinafter, Swallowing Camels]; with infra Parts IV (arguing that agency failure has little impact and may even lower plea prices in low-stakes cases); infra Part VII (raising
several deficiencies of equivocal pleas and instead proposing systemic acceptance of false pleas).
Moreover, Alschuler never explored my central point concerning the interplay between recidivism
and innocence. See infra Part I.
Professors Scott and Stuntz, for their part, discuss plea bargaining for the innocent in a limited context only: they offer a persuasive defense of bargaining generally and posit that the innocent also may benefit from the practice. But they worry that inculpable defendants are more
likely to seize bad pleas because they are risk averse. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1943,
1967-68. I disagree with their underlying premise that the innocent are apt to plead on bad
terms. See infra notes 42, 181. In any event, they do not explore when and why it makes the
most sense for the innocent to plead guilty, and they make no proposal for a means of access to
such pleas.
7 See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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Second, most plea bargains terminate petty cases in exchange for trivial
sentences—notwithstanding academic and popular over-attention to uncommon
instances of high-stakes bartering over years in prison in high-profile cases.11
Third, the pretrial process is painful. Punishment does not begin with sentence. Many defendants—even the innocent—do not welcome a process that frequently constitutes most, if not all, the punishment they will face. For the typical recidivist innocent defendant facing the typical petty charge, the more abbreviated the process, the less the punishment.12
Of course, necessary first-order questions are whether defendants really
receive such substantial bargains, and what accounts for these discounts. Conventionally, prosecutors are viewed as rational wealth maximizers whose chief
plea-bargaining ends are to promote efficiency while garnering the highest frequency of convictions with the highest possible sentence per conviction.13 If this
conception were uniformly true, prosecutors could leverage defendants’ process
costs to extract increased bargained sanctions. For instance, the confined defendant facing a misdemeanor charge might rationally accept any plea offer that
promises a sentence a bit less than pretrial delay. However, this conventional
view of prosecutorial motivation proves only part right. Prosecutors are conviction maximizers: they operate under a presumption of guilt and carry an aversion
to wholesale dismissal of cases once charged, especially in cases against recidivist
defendants.14 However, they do not aim principally—or even at all—to maximize
sentences where the charges are minor. Indeed for clean-record defendants,
prosecutors may not maximize sentences even where the charges are moderately
serious. Instead, prosecutors often provide bargain concessions that far exceed
what is necessary to motivate pleas.15
Prosecutors make such lenient offers because they can. They enjoy little
public or official scrutiny in all but the most serious and high-profile cases. In
low-stakes cases, prosecutors are much more interested in reducing their own
administrative costs while earning some type (any type) of un-delayed conviction.
The adversarial model breaks down—or at least becomes a secondary consideration—to workgroup cooperative principles. For all involved, the best pleas are
quick pleas. And quick pleas are most efficiently reached at low market prices,
because (although prosecutors may abandon sentence maximization) defendants
remain always sentence minimizers.16 The threat that defendants might demur
11 See infra note 29 and accompanying text; see also MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE
PUNISHMENT 5 (1979) (noting that criminal justice system is discussed typically in terms of the
“big” cases that in fact “are exceptional—indeed almost unique.”); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 11 (1978) (“Most studies of plea bargaining have been limited to the disposition of felonies.”).
12 See infra Part II, and note 75 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 38-45, 164-166 and accompanying text.
15 See infra Part III.
16 See infra notes 113-161 and accompanying text.
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leads even self-interested defense attorneys and prosecutors to set prices low ex
ante as the most efficient way to ensure that the largest number of defendants
plead guilty with the least amount of hesitation.17
The advantages of plea-bargaining for defendants are not uniform across
cases, however. As stakes raise, plea bargaining comes to resemble more closely
the orthodox ideal of adversarial gamesmanship: prosecutors yield only enough to
win pleas and use overcharging to compel high prices. In these serious cases,
bargaining is escape only from the prohibitive risk of substantial trial penalties,
not from trial processes that defendants would otherwise welcome. Bargaining,
here, may be rational, but it is no normative good. But, significantly, this overcharging critique, is an objection to bargaining and charging discretion generally.
The problem affects all defendants; it is not exclusive to the innocent.18
If it is normatively appropriate for the innocent to plead guilty in lowstakes cases, and rational—albeit normatively problematic for reasons unrelated
to guilt and innocence—for the innocent to plead guilty in high-stakes cases, then
the system must provide effective avenues for innocent defendants to plead
guilty.19 Two possible avenues are nolo contendere (or no-contest) pleas and socalled Alford (or equivocal) pleas.20 However, both plea types present problems.
First, they are inconsistently available, leaving haphazard disparities both
within and across jurisdictions between those innocent defendants permitted to
plead guilty and those forced to trial. Second, both types of plea lead to unanticipated post-conviction consequences. Third, Alford pleas raise the possibility that
courts might erroneously accept constitutionally impermissible involuntary
pleas.21
Ultimately, the best avenue to guarantee equal access to plea bargaining
and guilty pleas is regularization and systemic acceptance of a common—though
neither uniform nor conventionally welcome—underground practice: permitting
innocent defendants to offer false on-the-record admissions of guilt. This recommendation is wholly ethical if the system re-conceives of false admissions as utilitarian legal fictions.22
This article has seven parts. In Part I, I discuss selection biases that lead
to the disproportionate arrest, prosecution, and trial conviction of recidivist innocent defendants. In Part II, I assess defendants’ process costs and explain when
these costs most influence defendants’ decision making. In Part III, I explore
prosecutors’ incentives to offer lenient bargains in low-stakes cases. In Part IV, I
detail defendants’ bargaining advantages in low-stakes cases. In Part V, I consider the particularly serious cases where process costs are of no significant conSee infra notes 162-185 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 192-216 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 220-249 and accompanying text.
20 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
21 See infra notes 254-279 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 280-314 and accompanying text.
17
18
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sequence and where, conversely, overcharging and trial penalties become genuine
concerns. In Part VI, I address objections to permitting innocent defendants to
plead guilty. In Part VII, I explain why Alford and nolo contendere pleas are inadequate to ensure access to rational-choice guilty pleas. Instead, I propose ethical and systemic acceptance of false pleas as means to guarantee innocent defendants’ equal access to the benefits of bargaining.
I. THE USUAL SUSPECTS
There is no longer any serious question that innocent people are charged
and convicted of crime.23 These instances of wrongful conviction may be uncommon, but, even so, they likely affect thousands per year nationwide.24 Still, public perceptions of the characteristics of the innocent accused remain fuzzy—if not
inaccurate. Commonly, the media portrays the innocent accused as the railroaded “good person”—the law-abiding citizen robbed of liberty and tossed in a
dank cell by incompetent or even crooked prosecutors and police.25 Undoubtedly,
some such cases exist. But the safe assumption is that they are the rarest type of
a rare category. In fact, recidivists are overrepresented among innocent defendants and probably comprise the majority of the population because institutional
biases select for their arrest, prosecution, and trial conviction.26
See Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123 (2005); Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital
Cases, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (1998); Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1342-58 (1997).
24 Givelber, supra note 23, at 1343 (citing studies estimating rate of conviction of innocent defendants between 0.5% and 8% of all cases, and noting that even lowest estimate entails conviction of several thousand per year).
25 Any number of films reinforce this misperception. See, e.g., CATCH A FIRE (Focus Features
2006), THE HURRICANE (Universal Pictures 1999); THE SHAWSHANK REDEMPTION (Columbia Pictures 1994); THE FUGITIVE (Warner Bros. 1993); MY COUSIN VINNY (20th Century Fox 1992). But
c.f. JOHNNY CASH, Joe Bean, on AT FOLSOM PRISON (CBS 2006) (“Yes, they're hanging Joe Bean
this morning, for a shooting that he never did. He killed twenty men, by the time he was ten, he
was an unruly kid.”).
26 See RICHARD O. LEMPERT, SAMUEL R. GROSS & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE 326 n.10 (3d ed. 2000) (providing informative example of selection biases in action);
RONALD J. ALLEN, RICHARD B. KUHNS & ELEANOR SWIFT, EVIDENCE: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS
303 (2d ed. 1997); see generally Samuel Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, in
ROUGH JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS 254 (John A. Robertson ed. 1974)
(noting that few of convicted innocents “would be considered desirable citizens since most have
long records of prior convictions for crimes of which they were actually guilty”).
Even without accounting for these biases, a safe assumption is that most innocent defendants are recidivists, because recidivists comprise the majority of overall criminal defendants. In
2002, in the nation’s 75 largest counties, 76% of state-court felony defendants had at least one
prior arrest, 50% had five arrests or more, 59% had at least one prior conviction, and 24% had five
or more convictions. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2002, at 12-13 tbls. 10-11 (2006), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract [hereinafter DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS]. National misde23
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A. Arrest Biases
Recidivists are common first targets when crime happens, or even when they
are simply on public sidewalks or in building lobbies in high-crime areas.27 They
are stopped because they are known to police or just because they are more likely
to look the criminal part.28 This on-the-beat selection bias for repeat players is
most pronounced when police enforce minor crime—particularly the petty publicorder offenses that have increasingly become the grist of criminal court mills.29
But even in more serious cases, police are prone to arrest recidivists erroneously,
because, when no concrete leads exist, police direct crime victims to mug-shot
books composed exclusively of prior arrestees.30 In short, when police lack concrete leads—or even when they just need higher arrest numbers—the time has
come to “round up the usual suspects,” as Captain Renault announced in Casablanca.31

meanor data is unavailable. In fact, I could find detailed data for New York City only. Accordingly, throughout the article, I draw on this source. In 1998, 46% of misdemeanor defendants in
New York City had some kind of criminal record. NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY,
TRENDS IN CASE AND DEFENDANT CHARACTERISTICS, AND CRIMINAL COURT PROCESSING AND OUTCOMES, IN NON-FELONY ARRESTS PROSECUTED IN NEW YORK CITY’S CRIMINAL COURTS 23 tbl.3a
(2002), available at www.nycja.org/research/research.htm [hereinafter CJA, NON-FELONY
TRENDS].
27 See id. at 217 (“[P]olice work is organized so that persons mistakenly charged are likely to
have criminal records.”); Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial,
COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1271-72 (2001); David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 753 (2001); Levenson, supra note 1, at 40-41.
28 See RICHARD O. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
217 & n.47 (2d ed. 1982); cf. Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the
Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 986-87 (1999).
29 See, e.g., STATE OF NEW YORK UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK: ANNUAL REPORT 29, 32-33 (2005), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us [hereinafter, NEW YORK, ANNUAL REPORT]; CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 26, at 20; see also infra note 115 (discussing rises in public-order arrests); see generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 291 (1998). For
example, in New York City, arrests for theft of services (turnstile hops) rose from 1,693 in 1989 to
22,686 in 1998. CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 26, at tbl.6. Arrests for all categories of
trespass rose from 2,596 in 1989 to 8,796 in 1998. Id. at tbl.9. Most strikingly, arrests for nonfelony possession of marijuana rose from 1,214 in 1989 to 32,032 in 1998. Id. at tbl.4; see also
Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1 (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html.
30 See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 28, at 217; Sanchirico, supra note 27, at 1271-72
(“The police are more likely to ask around about an individual, interrogate him in person, search
his person, his house and his car, call him in for a lineup and show his picture to victims, if he
already has a criminal record.”); Dana, supra note 27, at 753.
31 CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942). I wish I could claim this illustrative reference as my
own. See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 28, at 217.
9
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B. Charging Biases
At the screening phase, prosecutors err on the side of charging—a predisposition that affects all arrestees, not just recidivists.32 There are two principal
reasons. First, in the interest of comity, prosecutors must level charges against a
great portion of those that police process.33 Second, prosecutors carry a general
“presumption of guilt” that leads them to resolve inconsistencies in favor of
guilt.34 This charging presumption is strongest when police arrest recidivists.
Prosecutors assume—perhaps with good reason—that recidivists are “guilty of
some crime.”35 As such, prosecutors are unlikely to exercise discretion to decline
prosecution.36 Even in the weakest cases, prosecutors can charge and anticipate
pleas because they know that recidivists cannot easily fight charges at trial under existing evidence rules.37

32 Many scholars have highlighted a systemic prosecutorial screening failure. See Ronald
Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002); see also
Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation and Data About the Acquitted, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1167, 1180 (2005); Schulhofer, Regulatory System, supra note 1, at 52.
33 See George F. Cole, The Decision to Prosecute, ROUGH JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LOWER
CRIMINAL COURTS 127 (John A. Robertson ed. 1974) (“[T]he police . . . are dependent upon the
prosecutor to accept the output of their system; rejection of too many cases can have serious repercussions affecting the morale, discipline, and workload of the force.”); see also Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1297, 1328 (2000);
Givelber, supra note 23, at 1362 (“Unless the police report on its face reveals an inconsistency or
barrier to conviction, the prosecutor accepts the general conclusion of the police without making
an independent investigation or evaluation of the evidence.”); CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra
note 26, at 12 & tbl. 1.
34 HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 103; accord Givelber, supra note 32, at 1180-88; Leipold, supra note 33, at 1328 (“[E]ven in the absence of bad faith prosecutors have incentives to resolve
nagging doubts about a suspect’s guilt in favor of prosecution.”); George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 110-13 (1975); Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in
the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52, 57-58 62 (1967); see also 1 AMERICAN BAR ASS’N,
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at § 3-3.9(b)(2d ed. 1980) (providing that prosecutors may not
ethically bring charges unless they believe defendants to be factually guilty); U.S. DEPARTMENT
JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, at § 9-27.220(A) (2005), available at
OF
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/index.html (same) [hereinafter, DOJ,
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL].
35 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 303; accord Dash, supra note 26, at 256 (“That the man
might be innocent appears not to worry [the prosecutor] . . . because of his record, [the defendant]
must have committed some undetected crime and deserves any sentence he gets.”); LEMPERT &
SALTZBURG, supra note 28, at 217-18.
36 See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
37 See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 28, at 217 (“[T]he advantage which past crimes evidence gives the prosecutor at trial means that a weak case is less likely to be dropped.”); see also
infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (discussing several conviction biases against recidivists).
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C. Dismissal Aversion
Once charged, innocent defendants—particularly recidivists—are unlikely to
convince prosecutors that the charges are wrongful. Prosecutors have every incentive to spin away a story of innocence. First, prosecutors retain the same presumption of guilt that led them to charge erroneously.38 Second, even if prosecutors were receptive to protestations of innocence, innocent defendants cannot effectively signal genuine innocence because prosecutors know that guilty defendants will attempt to copy any halfway persuasive signal.39 In any event, in
many low-stakes cases there is no time for thorough signaling.40 Third, prosecutors can justify incuriosity as appropriately leaving jury questions to the jury.41
Fourth, line prosecutors often must obtain supervisory approval before dismissing cases,42 even though they enjoy no similar official oversight over their bargaining, charging, and trial decisions generally.43 At bottom, prosecutors carry a
mindset of “non-defeat”—an aversion to dismissal present in all cases, but most
pronounced in cases against recidivists.44 In this sense, prosecutors consistently

See Givelber, supra note 23, at 1363 (“Having made this decision [to charge], the prosecutor will not retreat easily from it without securing something in return, such as a plea.”); see also
sources, supra, at note 34. A vivid example of this tracked thinking is prosecutorial unwillingness to concede error even in the face of exculpatory post-conviction DNA evidence. Instead,
prosecutors fall back on dubious alternative theories to justify ill-won convictions. See Daniel S.
Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U.
L. Rev. 125 (2004).
39 See Givelber, supra note 32, at 1195; William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 40 (1997); Scott & Stuntz, supra note
5, at 1935-49, 1967; Felkenes, supra note 34, at 113.
40 See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 11 (“[T]he overwhelming majority of cases took just a few
seconds.”); Lynch, supra note 1, at 126 (describing how prosecutors plea bargain cases in “machine-gun fashion”).
41 See UVILLER, supra note 2, at 192-93; Givelber, supra note 32, at 1181 (“[P]rosecutors may
decide that the defendant should, quite literally, ‘tell it to the judge.’”); Skolnick, supra note 34, at
57-58.
42 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50,
64 n.42 (1968) (“[I]t [is] easier to lose the case than to go through the bureaucratic obstacles preliminary to dismissal.”); see also Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1041 (1972).
43 See infra notes 164-166 and accompanying text.
44 Skolnick, supra note 34, at 57 (“In the county studied, the prosecutor’s office cared less
about winning than about not losing. The norm is so intrinsic. . . . It cannot be attributed to such
a simple and obvious fact as the periodic requirement of reelection. Indeed, reelection seemed to
be taken for granted.”) (emphasis in original); accord Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside
the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2472 (2004) (“[Prosecutors’] psychology of risk aversion and loss aversion reinforces the structural incentives to ensure good statistics and avoid risking losses.”); Felkenes, supra note 34, at 117 (analyzing prosecutors’ “conviction psychology”); Alschuler, supra note 42, at 64. Notably, the conviction rate in cases against recidivist and detained
defendants (who are more likely to be recidivists) is substantially higher, which indicates a lower
38
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function as conviction maximizers even if they only rarely operate as sentence
maximizers.45
What then accounts for prosecutorial dismissals? After all, prosecutors consistently dismiss about a quarter of felonies nationally, a third of New York City
felonies, and a tenth of New York City misdemeanors.46 Closer analysis of the
numbers, however, reveals two trends: first, dismissals have little to do with
prosecutorial belief in innocence; and, second, dismissals are least likely in the
low-stakes public-order cases that innocent recidivist defendants are most likely
to face.47 Specifically, the data reveal that felonies are dismissed more frequently
than non-felonies, and violent offenses are dismissed far more frequently than
victimless offenses.48 In fact, in New York City, non-felony harm-to-persons
cases are dismissed at a rate almost ten times higher than the rate for non-felony
drug cases.49 At first blush, it seems odd that prosecutors would more readily
dismiss serious cases with concrete victims. But that’s just the point: crimes with
victims generally require lay-witness cooperation and must be dismissed when
cooperation is not forthcoming. Indeed, studies have found that non-cooperation
is the leading cause of case dismissal and decisions to not charge.50 Notably, in
dismissal rate. DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 26, at tbl.24; CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS,
supra note 26, at tbl.16.
45 See Dash, supra note 26, at 256; Bibas, supra note 44, at 2471-72; Alissa Pollitz Worden,
Policymaking by Prosecutors: The Uses of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73 JUDICATURE 335, 337 (1990) (“Conviction rates constitute simplistic but easily advertised indicators of
success since they appear to measure prosecutors’ ability to win cases.”); Felkenes, supra note 34,
at 114 (“[A]n individual’s success as a prosecutor may be measured by the number of criminal
convictions which he has been able to secure.”); Rabin, supra note 42, at 1045, 1071 (1972)
(“[C]onvictions are the central performance standard, and departures from the average rate raise
questions and create anxieties. . . . [N]egotiation of a plea, any guilty plea, is a victory; the conviction rate is a quantitative, not a qualitative, measure of effectiveness.”); see also Daniel C.
Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability? 83 VA. L.
REV. 939, 966-67 (1997); Wright & Miller, supra note 32, at 35.
46 DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 26, at tbl.23; NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AGENCY, TRENDS IN FELONY CASE PROCESSING IN THE 1990S, tbl.E.2-1 (2000), available at
www.nycja.org/research/research.htm [hereinafter CJA, FELONY TRENDS]; CJA, NON-FELONY
TRENDS, supra note 26, at tbl.14. As noted, supra note 26 and infra note 131, national misdemeanor data is non-existent. Therefore, I rely on New York City misdemeanor data by way of
example. Neither the New York City misdemeanor data nor the national felony data segregate
prosecutorial dismissals from judicial dismissals (or even rare trial acquittals). I think it is a safe
assumption, however, that prosecutors are the source of almost all dismissals. If my assumption
does not hold, the rate of prosecutorial dismissals is in fact somewhat lower.
47 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
48 DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 26, at tbl.23-24 (indicating that violent felonies are
dismissed approximately 50% more often than other felonies); CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra
note 26, at tbl.15.
49 CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 26, at tbl.15.
50 See e.g., HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 26-28 (1982); see also Donald A.
Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 635, 644-46 & nn.33,35
(1999) (noting witness non-cooperation as leading cause of decisions to dismiss or not charge).
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the 1990s in New York City, non-felony charging rates rose and pre- and postcharge dismissal rates fell even as prosecutors were called upon to process more
than twice as many arrests—most of them for public-order “victimless” offenses.51
Prosecutors charged more and dismissed less—even as they tackled far more
cases—because they could; they did not need lay-witnesses in order to push these
victimless public-order cases forward (no matter how weak or strong the cases
might have been).52
Ultimately, then, it seems that prosecutors do not typically dismiss because
they desire dismissal or doubt charges (or even believe charges weak). And there
is therefore no good reason to believe that innocent defendants will be the beneficiaries of dismissals.53 They may receive such unlikely dismissals by blind luck,
but in the main they can expect a binary choice only: plea or trial.54
D. Trial Biases
Innocent recidivist defendants who choose to go to trial face a number of
hurdles that raise the prospect of wrongful convictions.55 First, innocent defendants are less likely to rely solely on putting the prosecution to its burden. They
have innocence stories to tell—typically of alibi.56 But they cannot testify without potentially opening the door to past-crimes evidence that may be used
against them for impeachment purposes.57 In any event, juries may not credit
even true stories.58 Second, recidivist innocent defendants are more likely to be
CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 26, at 12 & tbls.1,14.
Cf. Leipold, supra note 23, at 1160 (“[O]nce the process against an innocent suspect begins,
there is little chance that a case will be derailed against the prosecutor’s wishes before trial.”).
53 Cf. infra notes 236-238 and accompanying text.
54 See generally Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming
2007).
55 See generally Givelber, supra note 32; Gross, supra note 23, at 145-46 (“An innocent defendant who goes to trial faces a high risk of conviction. . . . [H]e will . probably be convicted.”);
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent
Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 2013 (1992).
56 Leipold, supra note 23, at 1130 (“It might be precisely when the wrong person has been
charged that factual development, alibis, and hard-to-find evidence are the most vital to the
case.”). Innocent defendants may also include individuals who actually played some part in the
alleged incident but whose behavior was non-criminal or met an affirmative defense as a matter
of law. Just like alibi defendants, these defendants have stories to tell, and they would seem even
less likely to be able to tell them persuasively. I think of Clyde Griffiths, the protagonist of Theodore Dreiser’s AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1925), who loses the will to murder his pregnant girlfriend,
but is convicted all the same after she accidentally drowns in his company.
57 See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 28, at 217-18.
58 See UVILLER, supra note 2, at 192 (“The stark, simple, and ugly fact is that true stories can
be as incredible as false ones. Maybe more so since the false story is fabricated to seem true. And
jurors cannot be trusted any more than the rest of us to sort the true from the false with a high
degree of accuracy.”); Smith, supra note 1, at 513; Givelber, supra note 32, at 1171. In this respect, the plea-bargaining recidivist defendant may feel that she played a greater role in her fate
51
52
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held pretrial which impacts their ability to communicate with their attorneys,
contact witnesses, and plan defenses.59 Third, “usual-suspects” policing creates
early opportunities for false identification. And false identification is the leading
cause of wrongful arrest and conviction, because police, prosecutors, and juries
give undue credence to its probative strength.60 Fourth, juries and judges are
more likely to be predisposed against recidivist defendants61—all the more so if
they can intuit, as is often manifest, that the defendant is confined.62 For these
reasons, it is no surprise that the great majority of DNA exonerations involve recidivist defendants wrongfully convicted after trial.63
These several biases present dangers of wrongful punishment—dangers
traceable, not to plea bargaining, but to the moments of arrest, charge, and/or

than the recidivist trial defendant who had to sit silently by. See JONATHAN D. CASPER, CRIMINAL
COURTS: THE DEFENDANTS PERSPECTIVE 51 (1978) (“One of the peculiar differences between trial
and plea defendants is the greater propensity of those who have had trials to complain that they
have not had the chance to present their side of the case. . . . [P]leas may foster a greater sense of
participation.”).
59 See Bibas, supra note 44, at 2493; Leipold, supra note 23, at 1130; Skolnick, supra note 34,
at 65 (“Several studies have demonstrated that, for the same charges, defendants who make bail
are generally more successful in countering accusations of criminality than those who do not.”).
60 See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 28, at 217; Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Research and Legal Thought, in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW
OF RESEARCH 105 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1981); Givelber, supra note 23, at 134748); Gross, supra note 23, at 136 (“Most miscarriages of justice are caused by eyewitness misidentifications.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1970
(1992). Courts have long held that cases may be proven beyond a reasonable doubt based solely
on the uncorroborated testimony of a single lay eyewitness. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 636
F.2d 727, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1972).
61 See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 28, at 218 (“[T]he jurors will not feel great regret if
they make the mistake of convicting a [recidivist] defendant innocent of the crime charged, because they will be sure the defendant is guilty of some crime.”); Givelber, supra note 23, at 1336;
Skolnick, supra note 34, at 65; Patricia J. Williams, Reasons for Doubt, THE NATION, Dec. 30,
2002 (recounting judge’s remark that “[t]he police don't have time to arrest innocent people. If the
defendant didn’t commit this particular crime, he did something, somewhere, sometime”); supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
62 See id. 65 (“The man in jail enters the courtroom under guard from the jail entrance. His
hair has been cut by a jail barber, and he often wears the clothes he was arrested in. By contrast,
the ‘civilian’ defendant usually makes a neat appearance, and enters the court from the spectators’ seats, emerging from the ranks of the public.”).
63 See Givelber, supra note 32, at 1189; Gross, supra note 23, at 142-43.
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trial.64 Rather, plea bargaining may be the best way for the innocent defendant
to minimize her erroneous punishment.65
II. DEFENDANTS’ PROCESS COSTS
But does plea bargaining in fact minimize erroneous punishment? Put simply, when, if ever, is it in innocent defendants’ interests to plea bargain? The
clearest answer is that plea bargaining is of near-categorical benefit to innocent
defendants in low-stakes cases, because the process costs of proceeding to trial in
these cases often dwarf plea prices.
Defendants’ process costs generally fall into four overlapping categories:
waiting, pecuniary loss, inconvenience, and uncertainty.66 Post-arrest, a defendant often waits twenty-four or more hours to see a judge. If this first appearance results in no disposition, the judge may either set bail, remand the defendant, or release her on her own recognizance. If the defendant is released or pays
bail, she must return to court multiple times. She faces public embarrassment;
anxiety; possible legal fees and lost wages; and the opportunity costs of meeting
with attorneys, helping prepare defenses, and attending mandatory court appearances where little often happens.67 For each appearance, she leaves home in
the early morning, waits in a long line to pass through courthouse security, waits
for her lawyer’s arrival, waits for the prosecution to procure its file, waits for the
case to be called, waits for court personnel to serve her with post-appearance papers, and finally returns home in the late afternoon.68 Conversely, if she is remanded or held on bail, she remains in jail until disposition at earliest. Once

See Richman, supra note 45, at 957; Givelber, supra note 32, at 1175 (“The initial screening will determine significantly the kinds of errors that are committed at the adjudicatory
phase.”); Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 1970 (1992) (“What disrupts this separation of the guilty
from the innocent is not a flaw in the bargaining process but a flaw at trial.”); Easterbrook, supra
note 5, at 320 (“If there is an injustice here, the source is not the plea bargain. It is, rather, that
innocent people may be found guilty at trial.”).
65 See Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 320; McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 922 (“An innocent
defendant who is induced to plead guilty because he would not have been acquitted at trial could
not have been saved by the American criminal justice system.”).
66 FEELEY, supra note 11, at 18; Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New
York City, 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1157, 1171-72 (2004); Martin Levin, Delay in Five Criminal
Courts, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 111, 121 (1975).
67 FEELEY, supra note 11, at 15, 32; Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1192-94.
68 HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 70; ARTHUR ROSETT, JUSTICE BY CONSENT 150-51 (1976);
Weinstein, supra note 66, at 1172. Clearly, there is a difference between appropriate and inappropriate process. Process scholars correctly condemn inapt delays and nonsensical adjournments. See e.g., FEELEY, supra note 11, at 10, 222-23; Lynch, supra note 1, at 119; Alschuler, supra note 1, at 951, 955. But even the most efficient trial process takes time, and process can be
trimmed only so far. See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 291 (“Processing costs are part and parcel of
the externalized operating costs in any organization.”); Alschuler, supra note 1, at 951, 955
(“[S]ignificant process costs are inherent in any form of adjudication.”).
64
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every few days or weeks, she is herded from jail cell to caged bus to crowdedcourthouse cell where she waits to go in shackles before a judge for a minuteslong appearance.
For all defendants, the pretrial appearances are several; the lead-up to even
a misdemeanor trial may take weeks or months.69 By contrast, pleas typically
may be had immediately.70 Significantly, these many process costs lie independent of case strength or acquittal chance.71 In fact, innocent defendants may have
higher process costs on balance than the guilty, because they are more likely to
put forward positive defenses, and these substantive defenses generally require
more preparation time and work than procedural claims.72
A. Process Pleas
In low-stakes cases, process costs dominate, and plea bargaining is a potential way out. The innocent accused who proceeds to trial over a plea to a pittance
may advance laudable societal principles, but she does herself few favors. The
costs of pleading guilty may prove so comparatively low in minor cases that
See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 70-71 (quoting defense attorney: “To the person who
wants to fight his case . . . . [T]hey’ve got to come back . . . . Back and back and back.”);
Weinstein, supra note 66, at 1172 (“[W]ithout any delay by the defense, it is very rare for a case to
get to trial before the fifth court date.”); see also Leipold, supra note 23, at 1140 (“[A]s every practitioner knows, there are so many exceptions to [the speedy-trial] limit that [the statutorily prescribed period] is typically just an opening bid.”).
70 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 69-71; Weinstein, supra note 66, at 1172; see also William
M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61, 72 & n.25 (1971). In New
York City, cases commence with an arraignment appearance that occurs on average less than
twenty-four hours after arrest. NEW YORK, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 29. Approximately
half of all cases are disposed of at this initial arraignment appearance, usually by bargained
guilty plea. Id. at 34 (2005); see also NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT
16 (2006), available at
www.nycja.org/research/research.htm [hereinafter CJA, ANNUAL REPORT]; Weinstein, supra note
66, at 1172. Even the cases that “survive arraignments” typically do not last along—unless they
proceed to trial. One study found that 84% of convicted misdemeanor defendants were convicted
within two months of arraignments and 95% within six months. NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, QUICK VIEWS, at http://www.nycja.org [hereinafter, CJA, QUICK VIEWS]. Yet, misdemeanor cases take an average of seven to nine months to proceed to trial. NEW YORK, ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 29, at 55. Likewise, 53% of felony defendants pled guilty within three months
of arraignments and 89% within a year. Id.; CJA, QUICK VIEWS, supra. Yet, most felony cases
took over one year to proceed to trial, only 10% proceeded to trial within three months, and almost one quarter went to trial only after the case was more than eighteen months old. CJA,
QUICK VIEWS, supra.
71 See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 31 (“[P]retrial costs do not distinguish between the innocent
and guilty; they are borne by all.”).
72 See Stuntz, supra note 39, at 40 (“Factual arguments are not merely harder to prepare and
pursue than legal claims; they are harder to evaluate. . . . In such a world, factual arguments—
claims [inter alia] that the defendant did not do the crime . . . —tend to require nontrivial investigation simply to establish whether there is any argument to make.”).
69
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pleading becomes a reasonable option even before assessing the real danger of
trial conviction and consequent sentence.73 Like the driver who summarily pays
the undeserved traffic ticket, defendants may conclude that the fight is not worth
it, especially when they may plead guilty at arraignments, just hours postarrest.74 It is small wonder, then, that so many defendants—innocent and
guilty—have little interest in process in these cases and simply wish to “get it
over with.”75
Professor Alschuler, one of bargaining’s foremost critics, made this point,
noting that bargains in the “overwhelming majority” of misdemeanor cases become “gratuitous overkill” because process itself is sufficient to prompt “process
cost guilty pleas.”76 Alschuler’s disapproval of seemingly superfluous discounts
may be sound as a critique of bargain justice generally.77 But for innocent defendants specifically, overgenerous concessions provide escape from undesired and
expensive process on defendant-optimal terms. These innocent defendants might
have pled guilty on the bases of process costs alone, but now they may do so with
less sanction. This provides a persuasive response to the complaint that
“[f]orcing an accused to choose between immediate freedom in return for a guilty
plea and continued incarceration in return for a claim of innocence seems perverse.”78 Would we rather force the innocent defendant to remain in jail to await
73 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 70; FEELEY, supra note 11, at 30, 277; Weinstein, supra
note 66, at 1172; Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 Clinical L. Rev. 73, 82 (1995). In this respect, defendants in petty street-crime
cases are strange bedfellows of defendant corporations, for which the process may also be the punishment: “A conviction carries at most a million-dollar fine, but simple indictment, which lies
wholly within the prosecutor's discretion, imposes multibillion-dollar losses.” Richard A. Epstein,
The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., November 28, 2006, at A14.
74 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
75 HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 69-70 (“Contrary to what the newcomer expects, defendants
are often eager to plead guilty. . . . [T]hey contrast the relative ease with which they can plead
guilty with the costs in time and effort required to fight a case.”); accord FEELEY, supra note 11,
at 276; Uphoff, supra note 73, at 81 (“[A] significant number of defendants just want to plead
guilty. Few criminal defendants, even those who are innocent, actually want to go to trial.”);
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1916; infra note 127 and accompanying text.
76 Alschuler, supra note 1, at 952, 955 (“For it is primarily the process costs of misdemeanor
justice that currently cause all but a small minority of defendants to yield to conviction; these
process costs are, in practice, more influential than plea bargaining.”); see also HEUMANN, supra
note 11, at 69-71; FEELEY, supra note 11, at xix, 33; Bibas, supra note 44, at 2492-93 (“The pretrial detention can approach or even exceed the punishment that a court would impose after trial.
. . . So even an acquittal at trial can be a hollow victory.”); Weinstein, supra note 66, at 1173;
Jerold H. Israel, Excessive Criminal Justice Caseloads: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, 48
FLA. L. REV. 761, 774 & n.43 (1996); Landes, supra note 70, at 68 n. 10.
77 The discounts may be superfluous in the sense that most defendants in low-stakes cases
would ultimately see fit to plead guilty even without them. But such discounts save on opportunity costs nonetheless. As an institutional matter, low-set bargain prices are the most efficient
means to ensure that unimportant cases plead quickly en masse, with minimal defendant hesitation. See infra Part IV and notes 145-152 and accompanying text.
78 Givelber, supra note 1, at 1364.
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a slow undesired process? For innocent defendants facing a prohibitively burdensome trial course, the choice is not between bargain and potential vindication
at trial; the choice is between pleading guilty and pleading guilty with the added
discounts that plea bargaining provides. Why should we not favor the latter—at
least for the innocent?
B. Process Costs and Defendant Categories
It is worth taking a moment to specify which defendants benefit from plea
bargaining to avoid process costs. Taking the most likely innocent defendants
first—recidivists charged with minor crimes—their process costs may be tremendous, particularly if the defendants are impecunious. Courts often rely on recidivists’ past records as a basis for setting more frequent and higher bail, notwithstanding lack of charge severity or even case strength.79 And it is doubtful that
recidivist defendants will make bail, at least in the short run. For example, in
New York City in 2004, only nine percent of defendants held on bail were able to
buy release at arraignment.80 And only an additional twenty-seven percent were
released at some later date.81 Likewise, national studies show that most recidivist defendants are unable to pay bail, and, as a group, they are substantially
less likely to pay bail than defendants without criminal records.82 When courts
set bail, recidivist defendants are likely to remain jailed through disposition.83
The trial course is long; even if convicted, the defendant often has already
served any post-conviction sentence—and then some.84 In this way, conviction
may counter-intuitively inaugurate freedom.85 Moreover, the costs of conviction
are minimal; an additional misdemeanor conviction does little to further mar an
already-soiled record, because the recidivist defendant has already suffered most
of the corollary consequences that typically come with convictions.86 If this de79 See NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, FACTORS INFLUENCING RELEASE AND BAIL
DECISIONS IN NEW YORK CITY, PART 2. BROOKLYN 25-28, 50 (2004), available at
www.nycja.org/research/research.htm (discussing importance of criminal history in bail decisions
and concluding that for some judges criminal record is “the strongest factor” in deciding whether
to set bail); see also NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, FACTORS INFLUENCING RELEASE
AND BAIL DECISIONS IN NEW YORK CITY, PART 1. MANHATTAN 29-43, 48 (2004), available at
www.nycja.org/research/research.htm; infra note 99 and accompanying text.
80 CJA, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 22. Remarkably, the figure rose only to sixteen
percent even for defendants held only on minimal bail of $500 or less. Id.
81 Id. at 24.
82 See, e.g., DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 26, at 20 & tbl.18.
83 Id.
84 See infra notes 139-141 and accompanying text (noting mean misdemeanor jail sentence in
New York City of 20.1 days and median of seven days).
85 See infra notes 125, 137-144 and accompanying text.
86 See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 28, at 218; Weinstein, supra note 66, at 1171;
McMunigal, supra note 1, at 988. There will, of course, be case-specific exceptions. A new conviction for a different type of crime may raise new immigration, housing, or child-custody complica-
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fendant can get a plea to a misdemeanor and time served, then the process constitutes the whole punishment.87 Any plea that frees this defendant may be more
than advisable—it may be salvation. No matter how certain of acquittal, she is
better off pleading guilty.88 She is the defendant that benefits most from plea
bargaining, and she is the very defendant that most frequently is innocent in
fact.89
Even for the rare unjustly accused “good person,” plea bargaining sometimes
may prove beneficial. Jail time is generally not a real consideration when this
clean-record defendant is charged with a minor crime. Pretrial, the court usually
releases her on her own recognizance, and even trial loss likely results in a nonincarceratory sentence.90 The decision whether to plead guilty generally falls to
whether the bargain confers a criminal record. Not all types of pleas are to
crimes. In many jurisdictions, a defendant may plead down to a violation (also
known as an infraction). A violation is not a crime, and conviction for a violation
leaves the defendant’s clean criminal record intact.91 If a defendant can get a violation offer and get that offer quickly, harm is minimal. Continuing to trial
would require multiple appearances, a misdemeanor trial, and the potential for a
misdemeanor conviction and record (and all the debilitating corollary conse-

tions. See McGregor Smyth, Holistic is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney’s Guide to
Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 479, 481-82 (2005).
New felony convictions may put habitual-offender statutes in play. Generally, however, for a defendant with ten prior misdemeanor convictions, the consequences of receiving an eleventh are
almost nonexistent. In any event, many corollary consequences are triggered by arrest, not conviction. Id. at 481; Leipold, supra note 33, at 1299-1300.
87 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 70-71 (quoting defense attorney: “They’ll take [time
served] simply because they don‘t care about what the criminal record is. They have criminal
records.”); Weinstein, supra note 66, at 1171. Additionally, a recidivist is more likely to recidivate
or warrant. If she leaves a first case open, is released, and picks up a second case, her ability to
dispose of both cases on favorable terms is complicated. To the extent that she fights both cases
at trial, a judge in a misdemeanor bench trial is prone upon conviction to at least unconsciously
factor the existence of the separate open charge into the sentencing decision.
88 Prosecutors may meet even demonstrable claims of innocence—for instance, in trespass or
ironclad alibi cases—with a period of bureaucratic hedging, and this wait may be unconscionable
for a detained defendant in a minor case who has available a plea to a jail sentence shorter than
the delay. In my experience as a public defender in Bronx County, New York, the prosecutor often would not be assigned until the case was weeks old. Even then, establishing contact with the
right prosecutor was a chore. And that prosecutor might delay for days more while seeking supervisory approval for dismissal. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
89 See supra Part I.
90 See infra notes 132-144 and accompanying text; see also HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 104;
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1948.
91 See infra notes 134-135 and accompanying text (discussing prevalence of violation offers
for misdemeanor defendants). A violation may carry minor penalties—fines, community service,
licensing hurdles, or perhaps even a few days jail—but the consequences of violations are generally slight and are familiar to anyone who has ever received a speeding ticket (a moving violation)
or a parking ticket (a parking violation).
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quences that come with it).92 Even assuming acquittal, the process costs swamp
the costs of a violation plea.
Even for the clean-record innocent defendant charged with moderate felonies, the influence of process costs may prove determinative. The court sometimes holds such a defendant pretrial.93 If the defendant is held pretrial, she
faces substantially greater process costs than even the detained recidivist defendant in a low-stakes case, because the pretrial wait is substantially longer for a
felony trial.94 However, pretrial detention is not a real process cost where the defendant receives a post-trial jail or prison sentence longer than the pretrial delay,
because the defendant typically receives credit for pretrial jail time.95 Put simply, a defendant suffers no harm for serving ex ante time that she would otherwise necessarily serve post-disposition. So, for the innocent defendant detained
pretrial, the process costs of detention are highly relevant if and only if (and to
the extent that) an offer exists that promises release in a period shorter than the
pretrial interval. If she can receive a non-incarceratory offer, the benefits of
dodging detention costs may outweigh even the substantial impact of a felony
conviction and years of probation.96
There is, however, a point at which the influence of process costs melts
away. The recidivist who is charged with a serious felony draws no clear pleabargaining advantage in terms of process costs. The court likely will hold her on
high bail or even remand. For example, one national study found that courts set
bail or remanded over three quarters of all recidivist felony defendants.97 The
defendant—particularly if indigent—is likely to remain jailed for the life of the
case.98 Potential sentences are appreciable, especially if habitual-offender stat-

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
One national study found that approximately one-third of felony defendants without
criminal records were released without bail, and, overall, over three-quarters were released at
some point pre-disposition. DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 26, at 20 & tbl.18. Notably,
bail decisions—especially in these borderline cases—are somewhat capricious; studies identify
marked variability between judges. See, e.g., sources supra note 79.
94 See id. at 32 tbls.E.2-5,E.2-6; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
95 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.30(3).
96 See McMunigal, supra note 1, at 986; Uphoff, supra note 73, at 85-86 (“Many defendants,
especially first offenders, will agree to almost anything to get out of jail.”); Thomas W. Church,
Examining Local Legal Culture, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 449, 489 (1985) (quoting defendant: “Hell,
I’d plead guilty to raping my grandmother if the sentence was probation.”); cf. Criminal Courts:
The Defendant’s Perspective at 47 (noting that the “break point” in defendants’ evaluations of
fairness is confinement).
97 DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 26, at 20 & tbl.18; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text. Overall, courts held recidivist defendants until disposition about 50% more frequently than defendants with no criminal records. Id. And defendants on parole were held until
disposition well over twice as frequently as defendants with no criminal record. Id.
98 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
92
93
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utes are in play.99 The threat of high sentences upends process-cost considerations.100 Significantly, the process costs of pretrial detention are generally nil because the prosecutor is unlikely to offer a sentence less than the time the defendant would be detained pretrial.101 Some length of detention is probably inevitable. Detention converts into a process cost only upon trial acquittal. For this defendant, process costs are non-determinative and trivial. Process is not an unwelcome cost to bear, it is all the defendant has left.102
III. PROCESS COSTS AND LENIENCY
Process costs are not exclusive to defendants. All players—prosecutors,
judges, defense attorneys—bear their own version of these costs. Prosecutors
must investigate cases, assess evidence, interview witnesses, file charges, present
matters to grand juries, staff court parts, prepare motions and responses, and
conduct hearings and trials. Defense attorneys investigate cases, interview witnesses and defendants, analyze defenses, make appearances, write motions, and
conduct hearings and trials. Judges and staffed courts host all of these proceedings.
The traditional conception of prosecutors as sentence maximizers takes into
account these administrative costs. Indeed, it recognizes that efficiency (in the
interest of deterrence) is the chief justification for plea bargaining.103 Prosecutors craft pleas to ensure the greatest number of convictions with each conviction
garnering the highest possible sentence.104 According to this model, most cases
would naturally result in adversarial “heavy combat” but for the unfortunate reality of resource shortages.105 Due process and plea bargaining operate as two
halves of a coherent whole. Both envision “a zero-sum game; the accused and the
state either win or lose, and what one gains the other loses.”106 Here, plea bargaining operates in the “shadow of trial”: protracted and individualized adversarial haggling produces results that reflect trial hazards and potential post-trial
sentences.107
See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 40 (“Unlike [misdemeanor] court, in which ‘time’ . . . is a
rarity, ‘time’ is what it’s all about in the [felony] court.”).
100 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 186 n.15 (“For more serious cases, the defendant’s interest is less likely to be summed up in terms of simply ‘getting it over with.’ He faces substantial
prison time, and quick disposition becomes less important.”).
101 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
102 See ROSETT, supra note 68, at 155; infra notes 200, 214-215 and accompanying text.
103 See Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 297.
104 See Landes, supra note 70, at 63-64; Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 292, 297; Jennifer F.
Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1988).
105 FEELEY, supra note 11, at 268.
106 FEELEY, supra note 11, at 26.
107 See Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Bazelon, J.) (“To the extent that
the bargain struck reflects only the uncertainty of conviction before trial, the ‘expected sentence
99
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This account depends on the engrained claim that plea bargaining necessarily exists only to prompt efficient guilty pleas so courts can stay afloat.108 While
it is true that courts in many urban jurisdictions would be hard pressed to manage their dockets in a world without plea bargaining—at least not without radically restructuring process and/or a substantial infusion of resources—much recent scholarship has called into question the “myth” that wide-scale bargaining is
a product of heavy caseloads.109 In fact, studies have found comparable rates of
plea bargaining in some low-caseload jurisdictions.110 Ultimately, then, plea bargaining occurs for reasons other than caseload or deterrence—at least in the lowstakes cases.111
A. Workgroup Principles
What are these other reasons? Prosecutors may claim a desire to “do the
right thing” by minimizing punishment for a specific defendant or by broadly relegislating perceived harsh or over-inclusive statutes.112 But prosecutors also
before trial’—length of sentence discounted by the probability of conviction—is the same for those
who decide to plead guilty and those who hope for acquittal but risk conviction by going to trial.”);
Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 1970-72 (“Settlements are better (or worse) as the outcomes of trials are better (or worse).”).
108 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (“If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by
many times the number of judges and court facilities.”); UVILLER, supra note 2, at 180-81; Givelber, supra note 1, at 1382; Wright & Miller, supra note 32, at 30-31 & n.5; Skolnick, supra note
34, at 55.
109 FEELEY, supra note 11, at 244-77 (“[C]ase pressure appears to have almost no effect on
plea bargaining policies.”); HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 32; ROSETT, supra note 68, at 110; see
generally Peter Nardulli, The Caseload Controversy and the Study of Criminal Courts, 70 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89 (1979).
110 See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 244-77; Israel, supra note 76, at 767 (“Studies . . . indicate
that the high guilty plea rates in many jurisdictions are spurred primarily by other concerns that
make resolution by guilty plea appealing to the courtroom participants irrespective of the weight
of their caseloads.”); Lynch, supra note 1, at 117-20 (discussing plea bargaining in suburban
county and noting that even “during criminal trial weeks, judges spent most of their time in
chambers while their courtrooms sat empty”).
111 See Bibas, supra note 44, at 2464 (calling the traditional model “oversimplified”); Worden,
supra note 45, at 335 (“[R]esearch on prosecutors has been handicapped by overly simplified conceptions of prosecutorial motivations, such as the assumption that all prosecutors strive to maximize convictions or to impose maximally harsh sentences.”); see also HEUMANN, supra note 11, at
104-05; Richman, supra note 45, at 966; Alschuler, supra note 42, at 52-54; Skolnick, supra note
34, at 65.
112 Alschuler, supra note 42, at 52-54; see also Dash, supra note 26, at 256 (discussing common law prosecutors who circumvented death-penalty statutes for property crimes); UVILLER, supra note 2, at 180, 197 (“What I thought I was doing, mainly, in the run-of-the-docket case, was . .
. rewriting the law, modifying the judgment of the legislature to fit the circumstances of the
crime, in accord with what I perceived to be the prevailing ethic in the courts of my time and
place.”); FEELEY, supra note 11, at 274; HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 109 (describing how prosecu22
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harbor the normatively more dubious motivation to avoid process and work
where possible.113 This separate variable exists in almost all cases but is most
acute in minor cases where caseloads are higher but stakes are lower. Prosecutors are loath to devote time, resources, and full process to “Mickey Mouse”
cases.114 Prosecutors may come to see arrests as “ends in themselves,” particularly for crimes like marijuana possession or turnstile hopping, but even for
crimes with concrete victims where the problematic confrontation resolved itself
with arrest.115 In this narrow sense only, caseload may drive plea bargaining:
“There will always be too many cases for many of the participants in the system,
since most of them have a strong interest in being some place other than the
court.”116 Plea bargaining allows the workgroup to minimize collective workload
and provides “solutions” to a common problem: the immutable burden that is the
process.117 Prosecutors may still care deeply about convictions.118 But they want
conviction by immediate disposition—period.119 They care little, if at all, for
maximizing plea prices.120

tor “redefines his professional goals” in face of statutes that “sweep too broadly”); ROSETT, supra
note 68, at 106; Richman, supra note 45, at 958 (“Criminal sanctions are blunt instruments . . . .
Prosecutors thus emerge as mediators between phenomenally broad legislative pronouncements
and equities of individual cases.”); Bibas, supra note 111, at 2470.
113 See Dash, supra note 26, at 256; UVILLER, supra note 2, at 180; HEUMANN, supra note 11,
at 103, 156-57; FEELEY, supra note 11, at 272; Bibas, supra note 44, at 2470; Lynch, supra note 1,
at 122-25; Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1136,
1142, 1161-63, 1181 (1998); Alschuler, supra note 42, at 52-53, 106-07; Rabin, supra note 42, at
1071.
114 HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 38 (quoting prosecutor).
115 FEELEY, supra note 11, at 274, 294; accord CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, infra note 26, at 1;
Lynch, supra note 1, at 121; Weinstein, supra note 66, at 1170-71.
116 FEELEY, supra note 11, at 272 (emphasis in original); see also Levin, infra note 66, at 125.
117 FEELEY, supra note 11, at 28-33, 159, 244 (describing development of “informal dispositional practices, lenient sentences, and a general spirit of cooperation among supposedly adversarial agents”); see also HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 62-63, 82-84; ROSETT, supra note 68, at 105;
Lynch, supra note 1, at 122-25; Skolnick, supra note 34, at 53, 58-59.
118 See supra notes 44-45, infra notes 166-167, and accompanying text (discussing prosecutors’ motivation to maximize convictions).
119 HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 103 (“The central concern with these nonserious cases is to
dispose of them quickly. If the defense attorney requests some sort of no-time disposition . . . the
prosecutor . . . [is] likely to agree. They have no incentive to refuse. . . . The case is simply not
worth the effort to press for greater penalty.”); Dash, supra note 26, at 256 (describing “fervent
desire of the prosecutors to establish a record of numerous convictions the quickest and easiest
way”); Bibas, supra note 44, at 2471-72 (“The statistic of conviction . . . matters much more than
the sentence. . . . Thus, prosecutors may prefer the certainty of plea bargains even if the resulting
sentence is much lighter than it would have been after trial.”); Alschuler, supra note 42, at 55.
120 See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 205; HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 71-72, 103-105 (“The newcomer is struck by the prosecutor’s eagerness to enter into a deal that seems beneficial to the defendant.”); ROSETT, supra note 68, at 107 (“[Prosecutors] routinely grant so-called concessions to
many . . . knowing full well that the attorney will not take up their time with a trial if they do
not.”); Lynch, supra note 1, at 123; William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Dis23
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Many plea bargaining opponents complain of the coercion of pleas that are
too good to turn down.121 But few inquire why so many pleas are far too good to
turn down. Prosecutors could take advantage of defendant’s comparatively
weighty process costs in low-stakes cases. Yet, these are the very cases where
prosecutors can most easily act for reasons other than sentence maximization.
First, prosecutors are subject to little public or official oversight in these cases.122
Second, as noted, prosecutors can rationalize leniency as normatively just in
many low-stakes cases.123 If society might be served by less significant penalties,
prosecutors can entertain work avoidance while credibly claiming to “render substantive justice”—a convenient excuse for leniency and speedy case processing.124
In short, the very cases where prosecutors can make the most of defendants’ high
process costs are the cases where prosecutors are least likely to do so.125 The
anomaly is that defendants enjoy great discounts in cases where process costs
alone might have led them to plead guilty without any discount at all.126 Where
process hurts most, bargain justice helps all parties most.127 Consequently,
appearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2553-54 (2004); see infra notes 121, 132-144 and accompanying text (providing data demonstrating leniency).
121 See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 1, at 123; Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note 1, at 2004-05; Alschuler, supra note 42, at 60; Langbein, supra note 3; see also infra notes 190, 222-253 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
123 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
124 FEELEY, supra note 11, at 11, 25 (emphasis in original); accord Dash, supra note 26, at
256 (noting other prosecutorial motivations for leniency, but concluding that “major” reason is
“the desire of the prosecutor for a record of numerous convictions by the quickest and easiest
method”); HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 62-63, 81-85, 101-04 (describing bargains as “reasonable at
worst, and extremely favorable at best”); Alschuler, supra note 42, at 106-07 (noting that prosecutorial “misgovernment” leads to lenient sentences); see generally Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note
1, at 1986 (discussing agency concerns that lead prosecutors to make “unduly lenient sentence
offers” that do not maximize deterrence or public interest generally); Schulhofer, Regulatory System, supra note 1, at 50-52, 63-66 (same).
125 See Lynch, supra note 1, at 123 (“As loyal members of the workgroup team, prosecutors
did not take advantage of the [defendants’] predicament . . . but instead consistently offered a carrot. . . . They knew that they, too, would lose professional face were they to force trials by not offering generous deals.”); see also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1948 n.131; supra note 78, infra
notes 137-144, and accompanying text. For example, sentence-maximizing prosecutors might refuse to offer time served to defendants detained pretrial. Prosecutors could exploit detention and
other process costs to exact sentences just less than pretrial delay. Yet, prosecutors take no great
advantage of jailed defendants. Indeed, observers have noted the frequent paradox that defendants held pretrial are released only upon conviction by plea. See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 3, 30,
139; Givelber, supra note 1, at 1364-65; McMunigal, supra note 1, at 990; James Mills, I Have
Nothing to Do with Justice, LIFE MAGAZINE Mar. 12, 1971, at 61-62; supra notes 85, 134-144 and
accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
127 This partially explains studies that find defendant satisfaction with plea bargaining. See,
e.g., CASPER, supra note 58, at 48-49 tbl.VIII-5; see also supra note 75 and accompanying text
(discussing defendant preference to “get it over with”). Casper’s well-known study of defendant
attitudes found that 64% of defendants who pled guilty believed they were treated fairly com24
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prosecutors make frequent plea offers to non-criminal violations and to timeserved dispositions.128
B. Lenient Pricing
Of course, it is no easy task to demonstrate leniency as a general principle in
low-stakes cases. The claim is probably most true for state-level prosecutions of
trivial public-order offenses.129 By contrast, federal prosecutors can be more selective at the screening phase; the cases they choose to prosecute are the cases
they think should be prosecuted.130 Additionally, my analyses are necessarily
limited principally to New York City, because I could uncover no comprehensive
misdemeanor data for other jurisdictions.131 These caveats aside, I believe my
leniency claim is somewhat universal. Indeed, various scholars have observed
widespread leniency in other jurisdictions.132 In any event, even if leniency exists
only for trivial public-order offenses in northern urban jurisdictions that still
pared to only 41% of defendants who were tried. CASPER, supra note 58, at 48-49 tbl.VIII-5. Remarkably, this 64% satisfaction rate was just shy of the 69% rate for defendants who had their
cases dismissed outright. Id. To borrow Hobbes’ expression, the plea-bargaining mill may seem
nasty and brutish, but defendants favor it because the attendant sentences are short. Cf. FEELEY,
supra note 11, at 29-30 (“If we looked only at jails, with their ubiquitous overcrowding, the criminal justice system might appear to be unduly harsh and severe. But if we sat in the gallery in a
lower criminal court, the process might appear chaotic and arbitrary, but essentially tolerant and
lenient.”).
128 See infra notes 132-144 and accompanying text.
129 See Bowers, supra note 54.
130 UVILLER, supra note 2, at 178.
131 Cf. Ed A. Munoz & Stephen J. Sapp, Racial/Ethnic Misdemeanor Sentencing Disparities:
Additional Evidence for Contextual Discrimination, 1 J. ETHNICITY CRIM. JUST. 27, 29 (2003)
(“The deficiency in knowledge surrounding the adjudication of misdemeanor crimes is somewhat
surprising considering they are the most common types of offenses for which people are detained,
interrogated, arrested and convicted.”); Michael J. Lieber & Anita N. Blowers, Race and Misdemeanor Sentencing, 14 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 464, 469 (2003) (“Only a few comprehensive studies of misdemeanor sentence outcomes exist.”).
132 See Donald I. Warren, Justice in Recorder’s Court: An Analysis of Misdemeanor Cases in
Detroit, in ROUGH JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS 334 (John A. Robertson ed.
1974) (finding that only 13.3% of black defendants and 5.9% of white defendants were sentenced
to jail in Detroit); Dash, supra note 26, at 253-54 (noting leniency in Chicago felony court); HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 81-85 (studying urban Connecticut counties and concluding that observed
dynamics probably “will hold across states but that some small—but nonetheless significant—
variation exists”); FEELEY, supra note 11, at 28-32 (studying urban and rural Connecticut counties); ROSETT, supra note 68, at 45-46 (studying Los Angeles county and noting that “[a]lmost all
of the cases flow easily through the discretionary system to dismissal, probation, a fine or a short
jail term.”); Lynch, supra note 1, at 117-23 (discussing leniency in rural and suburban New York
counties); Uphoff, supra note 73, at 89 n.63 (noting high frequency of pleas to deferred sentences
for first-time defendants in Oklahoma). Significantly, New York City criminal justice may actually be more punitive than other jurisdictions. One cross-state study of case disposition in four
urban courts found that sentences in Bronx County were generally higher for all defendants, particularly those with no records. Church, supra note 93, at 491-92.
25
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would affect a sizable defendant population—the majority of criminal defendants
in many of the nation’s largest cities.133
Looking at New York City specifically, the data show clear leniency. In
1998, fifty-two percent of all misdemeanor charges that ended in conviction were
reduced for plea to non-criminal violations.134 For clean-record defendants, the
rate of reduction was eighty-six percent.135 Even for the worst recidivists—
defendants with both prior felony and misdemeanor convictions—the rate of reduction remained over twenty-five percent.136
Likewise, over fifty percent of all misdemeanor charges that ended in conviction resulted in non-jail dispositions. And of the so-called jail sentences, fiftyseven percent were for time served.137 Even, for defendants with combined felony
and misdemeanor records, the rate of time-served sentences dropped only to near
fifty percent.138 Further, the percentage of express time-served sentences significantly underestimates the number of sentences that were in fact equivalent to
time served, because most defendants with designated time sentences actually
had completed those sentences by disposition. Specifically, for misdemeanor defendants sentenced to designated jail terms, the mean sentence was only 20.1
days and the median was seven days—notwithstanding potential statutory sentences of up to one year for A-level misdemeanors and ninety days for B-level
misdemeanors.139 Moreover, under New York law, defendants serve only twothirds of their sentenced jail time, calculated from the moment of arrest.140 So, a
defendant with a median seven-day sentence must serve only four days (rounding, as the system does, in the defendant’s favor).141 As such, many—if not
most—of these supposed time sentences were in fact fully satisfied by the time of
plea.142 Only the tiniest fraction of a fraction of misdemeanor defendants had to
Cf. supra note 29 (providing data on New York City public-order prosecutions).
CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 26, at tbl.17A (calculating average rate for A- and
B-level misdemeanors).
135 CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 26, at tbl.18 (calculating average rate for A- and Blevel misdemeanors).
136 Id. at tbl.18.
137 Id. at 29 & tbl.19. For clean-record defendants this 57% rate rose to 76.3%. Even for defendants with combined felony and misdemeanor records, the rate only dropped to 48.5%. Id.
138 Id. (noting that 51.5% received post-conviction jail sentence); see also HEUMANN, supra
note 11, at 81 (quoting defense attorney: “I am . . . I tell you, amazed . . . by how few people go to
jail. I mean, we get some pretty bad clients, and they don’t go to jail.”).
139 Id. at tbl.20.
140 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.30(3).
141 Id.
142 CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 26, at 29 & tbls.19-20; see also Freda F. Solomon,
CJA Research Brief: The Impact of Quality of Life Policing, at 7 (2003), available at
www.nycja.org/research/research.htm (analyzing this data set and noting that it “includes jail
sentences satisfied by pre-trial detention time”). For those who had not yet completed the median
sentence, even the shortest adjournment would likely be days longer (and there a trial requires
many adjournments). See supra notes 69 and accompanying text.
133
134
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serve any post-plea jail time at all.143 Put differently, many of these defendants
were jailed as part of the process and released as part of the bargain.144
C. Fixed Pricing
Lenient sentencing in a collection of cases begets lenient prices more
broadly. Bargains are struck according to “going rates”—known and somewhat
fixed starting-point prices.145 These prices may vary overtime as customary practices change, but at a given moment the going price for a certain charge against a
defendant with a certain type of record is largely market-set and unreflective of
statutory prescription.146 As such, the analogy of the plea-bargain regime to

143 CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 26, at 29 & tbl.19; see also HEUMANN, supra note
11, at 187 n.17.
144 FEELEY, supra note 11, at 30 (“For every defendant sentenced to a jail term of any length,
there are likely to be several others who released from jail only after and because they pleaded
guilty.” (emphasis in original)); Bibas, supra note 44, at 2492-93 (“[T]he shadow of pretrial detention looms much larger over these small cases than does the shadow of trial.”); Weinstein, supra
note 66, at 1171 (“If a defendant is denied bail [at arraignments], she will likely spend more time
waiting for the case to be resolved than would have been imposed on a jail term.”); Givelber, supra note 1, at 1364 (“The road to freedom is a guilty plea, whereas insisting upon innocence
means that incarceration continues.”). Even in more serious cases, prosecutors may offer lenient
sentences. Notably, in New York City in the 1990s, only 57% of felony defendants received any
kind of jail or prison sentence. CJA, FELONY TRENDS, supra note 46, 34 & tbl.F.1; see also HEUMANN, supra note 11, 188 n.17 (noting that only 48.8% of defendants in study of upper criminal
court received jail or prison time). Of the defendants sentenced to jail or prison, almost one third
received sentences that amounted to time served, only 2.4% were sentenced to over five-years
prison, and over 70% were sentenced to city jail time of one year or less. CJA, FELONY TRENDS,
supra note 46, 35-38 & tbl.F.3. Perhaps more significantly, almost two-thirds of all felony cases
were reduced and disposed of in lower criminal court as misdemeanors, violations, or dismissals;
and an additional number of felony cases were disposed of as misdemeanors and violations in the
upper felony courts. Id. at 27-31 & tbls.E.1,E.2-4; see also Dash, supra note 26, at 253-54 (noting
similar findings in Chicago felony court).
145 See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117,
2130 (1998) (“Many, perhaps most, cases are processed pursuant to fairly standard rules. . . . The
rules are more like those of the supermarket than like those of the flea market: there is a fixed
price tag on the case.”); see also HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 98, 104, 118 n.19 (“[A] ‘feel for a case’
develops with greater experience in the system. . . . [T]he defense attorney’s ‘feel’ is often not very
different from that of the experienced prosecutor.”); FEELEY, supra note 11, at 158-59, 275-76 (describing how repeat players know the worth of a case “intuitively”); DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 79 (1966); Bibas, supra note
44, at 2481 (noting that “repeat players . . . develop a feel for cases and can guage the going rate
for particular types of crimes or defendants”); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1923, 1933 (“[T]he
bargaining range is likely to be both small and familiar to the parties, as both prosecutors and
defense attorneys have a great deal of information about customary practices . . . [and] the ‘market price’ for any particular case.”); Douglass, supra note 1, at 447.
146 See UVILLER, supra note 2, at 179 (noting that the “worth” of a crime in the “ordinary
commerce of the courts” is less than the punishments prescribed by statute); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1923, 1933; see infra notes 206-209.
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trading bazaar is misplaced.147 The regime is more supermarket or department
store. Repeat players routinely process similar cases according to intuitively
known set bargain prices that are discernible upon quick reference to the defendants’ past records and the present charges.148 Significantly, recidivist defendants also come to know these prices and may balk if prosecutors push atypical
pleas.149
This concept of fixed pricing cuts against the notion of individualized bargaining, but only to a degree. In the lower criminal courts, bargaining happens
too rapidly to be wholly individualized.150 Instead, discrete tags act as proxies for
defendants’ individual circumstances and traits. From a set starting point, a
prosecutor may adjust prices by largely set increments based on information either that is manifest from the record or that can be conveyed to that prosecutor
succinctly.151 Moreover, because pricing at the outset is not static or individualized, when a collection of prosecutors make lenient offers for a given type of
charge this leniency serves as “precedent” for future pricing for that charge.152
This is true whether prosecutors were motivated in past cases by substantive justice principles, workgroup principles, or something else altogether.153
D. Judicial Input
Judges play a secondary role in the plea-bargaining process.154 But their
presence is nevertheless felt, especially as a check on bargains that are set out-

See UVILLER, supra note 2, at 177-78.
The pervasiveness of fixed pricing is a counterpoint to the common objection that defense
attorneys who consistently avoid trials cannot credibly threaten litigation. See, e.g., Bibas, supra
note 44, at 2478; Alschuler, Defense Role, supra note 5, at 1186-87. Prosecutors may extend marginally worse offers to defense lawyers who are recognized pleaders. But, in the main, a particular lawyer’s shortcomings are corrected by market prices that derive from aggregate defender
work. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1923, 1933. Moreover, the known pleader is in the best
position as repeat player to know intuitively the market prices and can object if she is not receiving them, perhaps enlisting the judge’s help to pressure the prosecutor to conform. See infra
notes 154-161 and accompanying text.
149 See infra notes 168-179 and accompanying text; see also Bowers, supra note 54.
150 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
151 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1922-23.
152 HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 120-21 (“After obtaining a specific plea bargain . . . [defense
attorneys] treat this disposition as a ‘precedent’. . . . Prosecutors, in turn, admit that they are
subject to these ‘habits of disposition.’ . . . Thus, a good defense deal in one case can have a
trickle-down effect.”); accord Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1922-23; see also infra note 167 and
accompanying text.
153 Cf. HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 161 (quoting prosecutor: “[W]e try to avoid stupid recommendations, but we do make mistakes sometimes, and they have these aftereffects.”).
154 See UVILLER, supra note 2, at 179, 186; HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 102; Wright & Miller,
supra 32, at 33, 39; McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 896.
147
148

28

Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2008)

side the prevailing market heartland.155 Like prosecutors and defense attorneys,
judges wish to avoid the administrative costs of entertaining litigation—
particularly in low-stakes cases.156 Generally, their first priority is to oversee
pleas.157 And they have little objection to the disposition on lenient terms of
“garbage . . . cheap cases.”158 Accordingly, judges are more likely to object when
prosecutors make offers that are too high rather than too low if high prices might
serve as obstacles to guilty pleas.159 Conversely, judges will rarely intercede to
derail even seemingly over-lenient plea agreements.160 This top-down judicial
pressure further fosters ex ante low-set “going rates.”161
IV. BARGAINING IN LOW-STAKES CASES
Agency failure is a prominent plea-bargaining concern.162 Undoubtedly,
some level of bilateral agency failure does exist. As Judge Easterbrook correctly
noted: “Of what agents is that not true?”163 But even beyond this truism, there
are strong reasons to believe that the critics’ great concern for defendantprincipals is misplaced—at least when it comes to bargaining in low-stakes cases.
Contrary to prevailing wisdom, imperfect agency in low-stakes cases does little to
interfere with defendant-optimal plea pricing and may in fact encourage it, because defense attorneys and prosecutors can best prioritize their own work avoidance by setting and keeping plea prices low.
See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1933, 1959 (“The judge is in a poor position to supervise the bargaining process, but he is in a very good position to recognize unusually high sentences.”); see also UVILLER, supra note 2, at 186; see generally HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 127-52.
156 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 127-52; FEELEY, supra note 11, at 271; Skolnick, supra
note 34, at 55; Stuntz, supra note 120, at 2561; Martin A. Levin, Delay in Five Criminal Courts, J.
LEGAL. STUD. 83, 90 (1975).
157 I practiced in front of one judge who used the same question to open every case he deemed
disposable by plea bargain: “What’s the disposition?”
158 Levin, supra note 156, at 95, 122.
159 See Stuntz, supra note 120, at 2561 (“[J]udges, like prosecutors and defense attorneys, are
invested in plea bargaining and try to facilitate it.”); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1959; Skolnick, supra note 34, at 55; Lynch at 120; Alschuler, supra note 42, at 105.
160 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 188 n.17; FEELEY, supra note 11, at 130; Wright & Miller,
supra 32, at 39 (“The judge . . . has little inventive to inquire behind the parties’ agreement.”);
Skolnick, supra note 34, at 62.
161 See supra note 145-153 and accompanying text.
162 Bibas, supra note 44, at 2477; F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, 16 BYU J. PUB.
L. 207-10 (2002); Lynch, supra note 1, at 123; Alschuler, Defense Role, supra note 5, at 1182-94,
1201-03; John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney—New Answers to Old
Questions, 32 STAN L. REV. 293, 319 (1980); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 Law & Soc’y Rev. 15, 18 (1967) (describing defense attorney as a “double agent”).
163 Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 1975-76 (“Agency costs are endemic and do not justify
abandoning consensual transactions.”); see also ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE
DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES 346 (1988).
155
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A. Oversight
Prosecutors are supposedly subject to public and official oversight, but these
restraints are highly attenuated—if existent at all—in low-stakes cases.164
Prosecutors can shirk their duties with relative impunity. Even when publicly
elected district attorneys adopt tough-on-crime postures, their assistants can covertly circumvent restrictive policies.165 And it is rational for district attorneys
seeking reelection to permit—or even privately encourage—bargaining for suboptimal sentences, because opposing candidates gain little foothold from minor
sanctions in minor cases but could make more headway spotlighting suboptimal
conviction rates. Conviction rate, after all, is the most visible rubric of quality job
performance.166 And that measure is achieved most readily by lenient quick bargains.167
Defense attorneys enjoy no similar freedom from oversight. Instead, defendants check defense attorneys—however imperfectly. Defense attorneys must
sell offers to their clients, and defendants always operate as sentence minimizers.168 Critics point to the pressures on defendants to plead guilty, and these
pressures are no doubt real.169 But defendants remain the most immediate check
on whether pleas will be consummated—certainly more immediate than public
and supervisory oversight of prosecutors. Defense attorneys may find it difficult
to convince defendants to accept harsh deals.170 Time-served pleas or the equivalent are so prevalent, because bargains that require jail time are more likely to
prompt defendants to reject them.171 And no one wants that.
Moreover, public defenders represent most criminal defendants, and these
lawyers engender clients’ visceral mistrust (however undeserved) to a greater de-

164 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 169 (noting that in all but high-stakes cases “a ‘zone of
indifference’ surrounds court practices” such that “the community is indifferent to how and why
cases are plea bargained or tried”); Bibas, supra note 44, at 2476; Lynch, supra note 1, at 125;
Levin, supra note 156, at 93.
165 See ROSETT, supra note 68, at 106-07 (noting that prosecutors undercut the projected image that they “are interested only in maximizing punishment”); Worden, supra note 45, at 338;
Schulhofer, Regulatory System, supra note 1, at 50-51, 64.
166 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
167 See supra sources at note 119.
168 See Stuntz, supra note 120, at 2554
169 Alschuler, supra note 42, at 64; Lynch, supra note 1, at 132; Schulhofer, Regulatory System, supra note 1, at 74; Schulhofer, Disaster note 1, at 1992.
170 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 81 (quoting defense attorney “[I]f I use the wrong word . .
. [it] may get them scared.”); Lynch, supra note 1, at 122 (describing difficulties convincing clients
to accept plea bargains); McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 896; Skolnick, supra note 34, at 66 (describing defense attorney’s need to appease client).
171 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 42 (“[I]f you are talking time, negotiations become
strained.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also, Bowers, supra note 54.
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gree than retained counsel.172 The clients of public defenders may require substantially greater concessions to overcome ingrained worries over self-dealing. To
keep defendants from exercising—even temporarily—their option to reject pleas,
it makes sense for self-interested prosecutors and defense attorneys to set lenient
bargain prices ex ante. Institutional prices remain low-set going forward—lower
even than necessary to make the pleas rational—because these prices are most
likely to allow both sides to finish their work quickly and go home early.173
Notably, although defendants have some check over poor bargaining results,
they cannot so readily check poor trial practice.174 Consequently, defendants
with bad lawyers are generally better off plea bargaining. Defense attorneys who
favor work avoidance over their clients’ best interests are more likely to hurt
their clients at trial.175 Plea bargaining is a skill, but it does not involve the
technical expertise or the time outlay required for trial preparation and defense.176 The point is particularly salient for innocent defendants, because their
cases more likely require heavier investigation and presentation of positive trial
defenses.177 The indolent lawyer may perform worst when telling a client’s story
of innocence. Conversely, that lawyer’s negotiation failures are constrained to a
degree by the defendant herself, by customary market pricing, and by judicial
pressure to correct atypically high prices.178 Finally, the lazy lawyer has increased incentive to diligently pursue plea negotiations, because the relatively
smaller investment in reaching a defendant-optimal plea price maximizes
chances that the lawyer will not have to invest heavily in repeat appearances, or,
worse, trial work.179

172 See Bibas, supra note 44, at 2478, 2486 (“Indigent defendants may distrust public defenders’ recommendations to cooperate because they already fear that their free lawyers are pushing
pleas to get rid of cases.”); Lynch, supra note 1, at 121 (describing defendants’ perception of public
defenders as “hired cronies” of the state); Skolnick, supra note 34, at 67; see also United States v.
Hill, 252 F.3d 919, 925-26 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting defendant: “I want him off my case. . . . I don’t
trust him. . . . He’s got too many people he’s helping out. So, I prefer he helped them out.”).
173 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 72 (quoting defense attorney: “Usually we get very good
first-offer-deals from the prosecutors.”); FEELEY, supra note 11, at 272.
174 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1922, 1933-34; cf. CASPER, supra note 58, at 49-51.
175 See generally Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 309 (arguing that imperfect agency is present
at all stages of criminal procedure, not just bargaining).
176 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 78 (quoting defense attorney: “[L]ike making love, you do
it enough times, you learn to like it, and you’ll get good at it.”); Lynch, supra note 1, at 131 (“I am
convinced that the average car salesman or real estate agent with a few days of instruction could
become an adequate plea bargainer.”); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1928, 1933.
177 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1934; supra note 72 and accompanying text.
178 See id. at 1933.
179 See id. at 1928, 33.
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B. Bluffing
When it comes time for bluffing, the defense attorney has an advantage over
the prosecutor: the defendant has a “call” on the prosecutor’s time.180 The defense attorney can make his bluff more credible by insisting that the defendant
fully intends to exercise her call, no matter how foolish that exercise may be.
This bluffing advantage may carry even more weight where the defendant asserts innocence, because the defense attorney can point to the innocence claim as
the reason the defendant refuses to come around.181 In this way, a bilateral monopoly more accurately describes bargaining in low-stakes cases.182 Defendants
and their counsel have room to push back, and prosecutors are unlikely to stand
firm.183 In the end, prosecutors must try cases if defendants refuse to plead. The
best defense tool then in the face of an atypically high price—or even just a price
that the defendant does not particularly like—is to create the perception that the
defendant is willing to engage her own process costs.
Of course, a defendant and her attorney can only use litigation to better her
bargaining position at the price of bearing process costs. For many, the best plea
is a quick one. In every courthouse, however, there are “gamblers”—defense attorneys and defendants who buck the general trend toward cooperation and fight
on for the love or principle of the fight.184 When these defense attorneys drive
180 Id. at 1923-24 (“The defendant’s [trial] entitlement thus motivates prosecutors to bargain—not simply to make offers and walk away.” (emphasis in original)).
181 Innocence claims may lead prosecutors to lower prices, but they are unlikely to convince
prosecutors to dismiss cases. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting that prosecutors
resist innocence signals). At best, prosecutors may consider a credible innocence pitch as one
more summary factor—together with criminal record and severity of charges—in the quick processing of pleas.
Professors Scott and Stuntz worried that innocent defendants were at greatest peril for unfavorable pleas, because the innocent are more risk averse than the criminally inclined. Id. at
1943. But to my thinking, the risk-aversion point holds true only for clean-record innocent defendants—the less frequent type. Moreover, clean-record innocent defendants, in fact, may be less
likely to take pleas: they may (i) be more reluctant to accept an initial criminal conviction which
carries greater corollary consequences than subsequent convictions, (ii) overestimate their
chances of acquittal, (iii) elect to try cases on principle even in the face of lenient pleas, and (iv)
have greater ability to fight cases at trial. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 28, at 217 & n. 45;
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 303; Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 1970; McMunigal, supra note
1, at 987; McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 2894, 924; Landes, supra note 70, at 69.
182 See Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 1975.
183 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 71-72, 186 n.18; McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 896
(“The greater the defendant’s desire for trial, the greater the sentencing disparity must be in order to induce a plea.”); Alschuler, supra note 42, at 56-57 (quoting San Francisco’s chief ADA:
“Defense attorneys use the fact that we have to move the unimportant cases as quickly as possible—it’s an effective way of doing their job”); see also UVILLER, supra note 2, at 181; Joseph Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TULANE L. REV. 695, 714 (2001); Levin, supra note 156, at 12021.
184 Skolnick, supra note 34, at 66; cf. Bibas, supra note 44, at 2479 (“[I]nexperienced lawyers
will be too unyielding in plea bargaining because they want trial experience.”).
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hard bargains it not only lowers price in these particular cases but pressures
general prices downward going forward.185
C. Case Weakness
Above all, prosecutors want some kind of conviction and to avoid wholesale
dismissal or acquittal.186 For weak cases, this “conviction psychology” translates
into marked added bargaining discounts.187 As one prosecutor explained to Professor Alschuler: “When we have a weak case . . . we’ll reduce to almost anything
rather than lose.”188 These discounts supplement typical low-set prices to make
irresistible already-lenient market offers—at least in low-stakes cases where
process costs loom largest. And these case-weakness discounts are of particular
relevance to innocent defendants, because the innocent are more likely to face
flimsy charges.189
Critics emphasize this last point as the precise problem: normatively, defendants facing weak charges should go to trial because they are likely to be acquitted, but the propensity of this group to plead guilty undermines the system’s central truth-seeking function.190 This objection carries obvious weight from a systemic standpoint, but for the innocent defendant who must endure a process
more painful than the proffered plea, the prospect of eventual acquittal is of
185 See Uviller at 181 (noting that if defenders refuse to plead clients to offered dispositions
“they can drive down the market . . . [and this] background prospect helps to keep offers at the
low end”); supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text..
186 See supra notes 44-45, 166 and accompanying text.
187 Felkenes, supra note 34, at 117; accord HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 106; Bibas, supra
note 44, at 2472-73; Lynch, supra note 1, at 132; McMunigal, supra note 1, at 990; McCoy &
Mirra, supra note 2, at 895-96; Alschuler, supra note 42, at 59.
188 Alschuler, supra note 42, at 59; see also Dash, supra note 26, at 256; Bibas, supra note 44,
at 2472 (noting potential for “irresistible offers in weak cases”); Uphoff, supra note 73, at 88-89
(“Prosecutors are well aware of the allure of the ‘no-jail’ recommendation and use it frequently to
entice a defendant into a guilty plea in a marginal case.”); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1942.
One study asked prosecutors which of a number of factors might lead them to plea bargain. Case
weakness was the only factor to which all prosecutors answered affirmatively. Note, Guilty Plea
Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 901
(1964).
189 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1942; Alschuler, supra note 42, at 60; Landes, supra
note 70, at 69. For example, one-witness identification cases are the presumed sources both of the
greatest number of false convictions and of some of the most pronounced case-weakness discounts. See Alschuler, supra note 42, at 63 (“Almost without exception, prosecutors list this case
as one in which unusual concessions will be given.”); supra note 60 and accompanying text.
190 Alschuler, supra note 42, at 64 (“If trials ever serve a purpose, their utility is presumably
greatest when the outcome is in doubt. The practice of responding to a weak case by offering extraordinary concessions therefore represents, at best, a dangerous allocation of institutional responsibility.”); Lynch, supra note 1, at 132; McMunigal, supra note 1, at 990; Dominick R. Vetri,
Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV.
865, 910 (1964).
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small consolation. Instead, many innocent defendants are quite happy for the
opportunity to give the prosecution a conviction—however ill-deserved—if they
may avoid daunting process and the potential disaster of full trial loss.191
V. WHERE PROCESS COSTS MATTER LITTLE
In serious cases, prosecutors drive harder bargains and aim for sentence
maximization to a greater degree.192 They are less willing and able to provide
categorical lenient deals. First, oversight over these high-profile cases is more
pronounced; prosecutors are less free politically or institutionally to lighten workload with over-generous offers.193 Second, prosecutors are more likely to try even
weak cases because they cannot justify the substantial discounts that make these
cases imprudent for defendants to litigate.194 In any event, recidivist defendants—who are the most likely defendants in high-stakes cases—have less ability to adequately fight weak charges.195 Third, defense attorneys cannot effectively bluff because prosecutors are readier to call and try cases.196 Particularly
where the charges are grave and the defendant has a serious record, prosecutors
concede only enough to make pleas just rational, and in certain cases they offer
no discounts at all.197 In fact, even when bargaining may be justified, prosecutors
may favor trial: victory in a high-profile case may polish a burgeoning reputation.198
Concurrently, defendants’ process costs diminish in importance. Pretrial detention is no process cost at all where the defendant will receive a sentence after
either trial or plea that exceeds and consumes the term of pre-conviction con191 Cf. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1935 (“The relative losers in a no-bargaining world
have no control over their fate; other forces—prosecutorial charging decisions, trial error rates—
determine whether they fare well or poorly.”); Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 1975 (“Black markets are better than no markets. . . . . Rights that may be sold are more valuable than rights that
must be consumed.”); CASPER, supra note 58, at 49-50 (discussing defendant satisfaction with plea
bargaining).
192 See Stuntz, supra note 120, at 2563 (“With respect to the most violent crimes, plea bargaining probably resembles civil litigation; law’s shadow looms large in these cases.”); Rabin, supra note 42, at 1072.
193 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 169; Richman, supra note 45, at 964; Stuntz, supra note
120, at 2563; Alschuler, supra note 42, at 107; Levin, supra note 156, at 90.
194 See UVILLER, supra note 2, at 179; Alschuler, supra note 42, at 107.
195 See supra note 37, 55-63 and accompanying text.
196 See UVILLER, supra note 2, at 179.
197 See id. (“Some cases—some homicides or other brutal crimes with more aggravating than
mitigating circumstances—got no offer of reduction; plead to the indictment or try it.”). Notably,
when prosecutors stress sentence maximization it leads necessarily to some sacrifice of conviction
maximization. See Stuntz, supra note 120, at 2563 (noting higher acquittal rate in murder cases
because voters will forgive acquittal but not leniency).
198 See Bibas, supra note 44, at 2472-74; Zacharias, supra note 113, at 1181-82; Rabin, supra
note 42, at 1072 n.92.

34

Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2008)

finement.199 And all other process costs pale in comparison to lengthy postconviction sentences. As stakes raise, therefore, defendants become more forward looking; potential future consequences take precedent over any focus on
present pain.200
Normatively, then, process costs for both sides abate in influence almost
precisely where they should. After all, these costs should matter least where due
process and trial rights matter most.201 Moreover, this is a small class of defendants—a mere fraction of the system’s accused—so the system could probably
provide this group full-dress trials without unduly taxing resources.
A. Trial Penalties versus Plea Rewards
The results are not so rosy, however. Trials are a bit more frequent in serious cases, but bargaining is still the primary mode of case disposition.202 The
question is why defendants continue to bargain in large numbers even when
prosecutors are highly reluctant to provide lenient offers. The reason is overcharging, and if there is a substantial problem related to plea bargaining, this is
it.
Felony criminal and sentencing law is astonishingly broad because legislators have every incentive to statutorily over-criminalize behavior, set over-harsh
potential punishments, and then leave to the executive the job of divining what
degree of enforcement best serves deterrence and the public good generally.203
See supra notes 95-96, 101 and accompanying text
See supra notes 97-102, infra notes 214-215, and accompanying text
201 See FEELEY, supra note 11, at 297 n.12; ROSETT, supra note 68, at 155 (“It is when the
punishments are most brutal that people justifiably look to the formal legal system for help in
controlling those in power.”); John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 223-24 (1979); Worden, supra note 45, at 340. Our system has
long recognized a need for enhanced process as stakes increase. See, e.g, Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66 (1970) (limiting the constitutional jury right in petty criminal cases); see also Andrew
M. Siegel, When Prosecutors Control Criminal Court Dockets: Dispatches on History and Policy
from a Land That Time Forgot, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 332 (2005) (noting tradition at common
law to provide “rough natural justice” to petty cases and formal process to more serious matters);
Langbein, supra, at 223 (“Continental and Anglo-American criminal procedural systems both exhibit as an organizing principle the idea that the full set of procedures and safeguards appropriate for determining charges in serious crime need not be extended to cases of petty crime.”).
202 In 2002, the plea rate nationally was 95% for all state-court felony convictions, but was
only 90% for violent felonies and 68% and 84% for murder and rape respectively. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
ONLINE, tbl. 5.46.2002 (2003), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook (hereinafter,
SOURCEBOOK, ONLINE).
203 See ROSETT, supra note 68, at 157; Richman, supra note 45, at 959 & n.69; Weinstein, supra note 66, a6 1160-64; Stuntz, supra note 120, at 2556-58; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at
1965; see generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505 (2001) (discussing cycle whereby legislative over-criminalization leads necessarily to
increased prosecutorial discretion that leads to further legislative criminalization).
199
200
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Overbroad statutes serve the legislature in terms of minimizing the opportunity
costs of legislative specification and maximizing tough-on-crime appearances.204
Prosecutors are thereby given extraordinary weapons. They can charge harsh
substantive crimes and habitual-offender sentencing statutes and then use questionable counts as bargaining leverage, offering substantial so-called concessions
that just lead to conviction and sentence on the only warranted charges.205 Generally, the counts are questionable not in the sense that the provable facts would
fail to meet statutory definitions (though this more extreme brand of overcharging may occur); rather, the counts are questionable because they fall outside the
operating systemic (and possibly communal) norms of what constitutes appropriate sanction for given conduct.206
Here, plea offers correct back to institutionally appropriate penalties, but
only upon sacrifice of trial rights. Plea prices start high, and prosecutors permit
little if any negotiation.207 Duress and coercion become real worries, not just for
innocent defendants but for all defendants.208 The unlucky few who venture trial
and lose are afforded sizeable trial penalties of sentences far in excess of what
systemic actors would typically deem proportional.209 Significantly, however, this

204 See Stuntz, supra note 120, at 2556-58; Richman, supra note 45, at 959 & n.69 (“[T]he
public might blame legislators for failing to criminalize conduct it condemns, but will blame only
prosecutors for bringing charges in a marginal case. Given this dynamic, legislators will always
be safer if they err on the side of overinclusion.”).
205 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 42; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1920-21, 1965;
Stuntz, supra note 120, at 2563; Wright & Miller, supra 32, at 33; Easterbrook, supra note 5, at
311-16; Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note 1, at 1992; McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 927; Alschuler, supra note 42, at 85-105; Felkenes, supra note 34, at 119.
206 See ROSETT, supra note 68, at 156 (discussing courthouse “norms” that hold “no matter
what the statutes might stipulate as a proper punishment”); Stuntz, supra note 120, at 2554-58;
supra note 146 and accompanying text. Because legislative prescription is so overbroad and overpunitive, the community may view lower prices as optimal even in high-stakes cases where
greater public oversight exists. See Stuntz supra note 120, at 2558 (“[P]rosecutors, at least those
whose political antennae are in good working order, will . . . often prefer lower sentences than the
legislature has authorized.”).
207 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1964-65; McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 927;
Felkenes, supra note 34, at 119.
208 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1964 (“[T]he prosecutor . . . put[s] pressure on [the defendant] to take the deal without further dickering. . . . The contract analogy is economic duress.”); see generally Conrad G. Brunk, The Problem of Voluntariness and Coercion in the Negotiated Plea, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 527 (1979). Indeed, the Court has noted that the “give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining” is a principal facet of its constitutionality. Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (internal quotations omitted).
209 See ROSETT, supra note 68, at 156 (“[T]here is a . . . tendency of officials to evoke the severe statutory penalty and to forget the less severe ‘courthouse law’ when dealing with defendants who have unsuccessfully used . . . legal tactics.”); Lynch, supra note 1, at 120, 123; see generally Givelber, supra note 1, at 1396-1406 (discussing trial penalties); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37,
46-47 (1983) (same); David Brereton & Jonathan Casper, Does It Pay to Plead Guilty? 16 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 45 (1981-82) (providing data to demonstrate substantial “trial tax”).
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prospect of trial penalties is not exclusive to innocent defendants; the penalties
threaten all defendants charged in high-stakes cases.210
By contrast, in low-stakes cases, the issue is more likely to be post-trial proportional sentences far in excess of over-lenient bargain rewards. Substantial
trial penalties are no great issue in these minor cases that “few view as seriously
criminal,” because overcharging is no real concern.211 Indeed, prosecutors may
even believe that the arguably merited charges already prescribe over-harsh penalties.212 In any event, prosecutors’ ability to overcharge is minimal for misdemeanor charges, because they can threaten no worse exposure than one-year jail.
Ultimately, the distinction between trial penalties and plea rewards comes
down to the difference between trading in trial costs versus trial rights. In lowstakes cases, if defendants choose to join in the communal pursuit of process-cost
avoidance, they are rewarded with sentence bargains of light sanctions and
charge bargains of violations or misdemeanors.213 This quasi-happy story of the
defendant who escapes costly undesired process on favorable terms is replaced in
high-stakes cases by the troubling account of the innocent defendant who is
forced under threat of trial penalty to forgo desired process to escape undue punishment.214 When process costs matter most, bargaining provides a savory exit
strategy on defendant-optimal terms. But when process matters most, recidivist
offenders plead guilty because the prospect of terrific sentence after trial conviction is just too terrifying. It is this distinction—between pleading guilty to avoid
a trial tax on the exercise of constitutional rights and pleading guilty to avoid
process costs (or for any other reason unrelated to trial penalties)—that has led
some critics to condemn plea bargaining while abiding guilty pleas generally.215
210 See Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note 1, at 1992 (calling for repeal of mandatory minimums
in order to reduce bargaining pressure, and noting that this reform would affect all pleading defendants, not just innocent); see generally Givelber, supra note 1, at 1393-99 (discussing trial tax
as burden that affects all defendants and that should be eliminated).
211 FEELEY, supra note 11, at 280; accord Stuntz, supra note 120, at 2563 (“[T]he less serious
the crime, the more likely it is that the legislature has authorized punishments no one really
wishes to impose.”).
212 See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text. As Professor Stuntz noted: “[C]riminal
law and the law of sentencing define prosecutors’ options, not litigation outcomes. . . . [T]hey are
items on a menu from which the prosecutor may order as she wishes. . . . [H]er incentive is to get
whatever meal she wants. . . . The menu does not define the meal; the diner does.” Stuntz, supra
note 120, at 2549, 2553-54. Generally, the prosecutor “has no incentive to order the biggest meal
possible.” Id.
213 See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 123; supra Parts III-IV.
214 See ROSETT, supra note 68, at 155 (“When the system is severe, the accused is justifiably
afraid to plead guilty to the crime charged. . . . [T]he path of acquiescence becomes less tempting .
. . . No one casually pleads guilty to robbery. . . . Conversely, only a man very confident of his
ultimate vindication will chance capital punishment.”); supra notes 97-102, 200 and accompanying text.
215 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1914 (“[A]cademic critics are not opposed to pleas, but
only to plea bargains.” (emphasis in original)); Langbein, supra note 201, at 213 (“[T]hat terrible
attribute that defines our plea bargaining and makes it coercive and unjust: the sentencing dif-
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Courts have frowned on prosecutorial overcharging and have even reversed
explicit prosecutorial or judicial threats of trial penalties.216 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court and several lower courts have repeatedly rejected constitutional
complaints of trial penalties in the absence of express evidence of vindictive motivation.217 In the usual case, a prosecutor or judge may readily intimidate the
defendant with the threat of an excessive post-trial sentence on overcharged
counts—so long as the prosecutor or judge is careful with her words. Unsurprisingly, defendants choose to plea bargain, not because they necessarily want to do
so in high-stakes cases, but because it is the sole sensible course.
VI. OBJECTIONS
To sum up, plea bargaining works best for innocent defendants for whom the
process is the punishment.218 But, because the system condones overcharging
and consequent substantial de facto trial penalties, bargaining also may prove to
be the least-bad option for some innocent defendants for whom process would
otherwise be welcome.219 Trials are imperfect after all, particularly for recidivist
defendants who cannot so easily challenge wrongful charges.220 Accordingly, it
seems wrongheaded and even unjust to allow a factually guilty defendant to
make a rational choice in the face of plea bargaining’s benefits and trial’s potential penalties and travails, but to force an innocent defendant—who, by her nature as innocent and facing criminal charges, has already been once systemically
abused—to risk against her will an uncertain trial with significant downside.221

ferential by which the accused is threatened with an increased sanction for conviction after trial
by comparison with that which is offered for confession and waiver of trial.”); Alschuler, supra
note 1, at 954-55 (finding acceptable guilty pleas but not plea bargains); Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note 1, at 1986 n.26 (same).
216 See, e.g., In re Lewallen, 23 Cal. 3d 374 (1979) (vacating sentence where sentencing judge
indicated that defendant should be treated more harshly for exercising trial right.); State v.
Boone, 235 S.E.2d 74 (1977) (same); People v. Picciotti, 4 N.Y.2d 340, 344 (1958) (“A plea of guilty
is, of course, frequently the result of a ‘bargain,’ but there is no bargain if a defendant is told that,
if he does not plead guilty, he will suffer [overcharging] consequences that would not otherwise be
visited upon him.”).
217 Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); JAMES E. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY
PLEAS, at 2-20 (2d ed. 1982) (collecting cases). A prosecutor may even threaten to recharge under
a habitual-offender statute if a defendant refuses a plea. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 357.
218 See supra Parts II-IV.
219 See supra Part V.
220 See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
221 See UVILLER, supra note 2, at 195-96; Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 1975 (“Forcing [the
innocent] to use their rights at trial means compelling them to take the risk of conviction or acquittal.”); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 55, at 2013 (“[T]he choice is between permitting innocents to
plead under the most favorable circumstances possible and forcing them to trial, where they risk
vastly greater punishment.”); Church, supra note 5, at 516 (“It is . . . somewhat disingenuous to
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Yet, that is precisely what some commentators and courts piously demand when
they insist that the innocent should never plead guilty.222
What are these critics’ principal concerns? There seem to be four concrete
reasons for potential pause: bargained-for convictions of the innocent may (i) engender disaffection with the criminal justice system and its norms;223 (ii) permit
real perpetrators to escape punishment;224 (iii) incentivize prosecutors to charge
marginal cases because they can anticipate pleas;225 and (iv) enable police misconduct by insulating unlawful searches, seizures, and other police procedures
from constitutional review.226 Further, these problems carry greater deontologi-

argue that the innocent defendant suffers from being offered an alternative to the high stakes of a
trial.”).
222 See, e.g., United States v. Price, 436 F.2d 303, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (noting that innocent
defendant may not plead guilty); United States v. Rogers¸ 289 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1968)
(same); People v. Butler, 43 Mich. App. 270, 280-81, 204 N.W.2d 325, 330 (1972) (same); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, Standard 14-1.6,
Cmt. (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter, ABA STANDARDS] (“Our system has concluded, in order to protect
the innocent, that persons whose conduct does not fall within the charges brought by a prosecutor
should not be permitted to plead guilty.”); John Wesley Hall, Jr., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE, § 15:10 (“Clients who maintain their innocence should go to trial
and [generally] should not be permitted to plead guilty.”); Dash, supra note 26, at 254 (noting
that justice system that permits the innocent to plead guilty is “a system of injustice”); Douglas A.
Copeland, Missouri’s Public Defender System, 62 J. MO. B. 10 (2006) (“[P]lea bargaining a defendant that may be innocent . . . simply doesn’t satisfy why the Constitution requires.”); Bibas, supra note 1, at 1382 (“It should go without saying that it is wrong to convict innocent defendants.
Thus, the law should hinder these convictions instead of facilitating them.”); Hessick & Saujani,
supra note 162, at 197 (“[A]n innocent person pleading guilty is inexcusable. . . . [T]o convict innocent people without a trial . . . exposes the failure to uphold criminal justice standards upon
which society is constructed.”); Jack B. Zimmermann, The Lawyer’s Duty to Promote the Common
Good, 40 S. Tex. L. Rev. 227, 228 (1999); Gerard V. Bradley, Plea Bargaining and the Criminal
Defendant’s Obligation to Plead Guilty, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 65, 72, 77 (1999) (describing trials for
innocent defendants to be “morally necessary” and noting that “common good is always served by
the trial of an innocent defendant (at least when a guilty plea is the alternative”); Schulhofer,
Disaster, supra note 1, at 1986; Mitchell, supra note 162, at 320 (stressing importance of innocent
defendants taking cases to trial); Barkai, supra note 1, at 143; Alschuler, Defense Role, supra note
5, at 1280-89, 1296-1301 (interviewing several attorneys who refuse to ethically abide or participate in guilty pleas for defendants who claim innocence); Eunyung Theresa Oh, Note, Innocence
After “Guilt”: Postconviction DNA Relief for Innocents who Plead Guilty, 55 Syracuse L. Rev. 161,
168 (2004) (“[A] guilty plea should not be an option if [the defendant] is innocent.”); infra notes
292-294, 303-308 and accompanying text (discussing perceived ethical problem of guilty pleas for
the innocent and citing sources).
223 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 1, at 1382-88; Hessick & Saujani, supra note 162, at 205-06.
224 See, e.g., Brandon J. Lester, Note, System Failure: The Case for Supplanting Negotiation
with Mediation in Plea Bargaining, 20 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 563, 570-71 & n.29.
225 See, e.g., Strandburg, supra note 1; Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note 1, at 2007.
226 See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution,
32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 324-32 (2004).
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cal weight if—as one might expect—they disproportionately affect poor or minority communities.227
The first two objections are largely nonstarters. First, plea bargaining for
the innocent causes little if any surplus disaffection. No doubt, the innocent defendant who must voice false words to get her bargain may feel that the system
has ill-used her twice. But the defendant’s enmity on that score is necessarily
less than her antipathy toward a compelled trial course (with all its attendant
process costs and risks), otherwise she would elect to fight on to trial.228 Conversely, she may even derive a degree of satisfaction from autonomously taking a
role in determining her own fate.229 In any event, even if false admissions feed
her disillusionment, this harm is of weak concern, because presumably she already has lost much faith in a system that in the first instance leveled false
charges (and perhaps even jailed her pre-plea). Again, if there are real problems
that cause disenchantment, they exist principally at the points of arrest and
charge. Separately, there is no deep concern over declining societal faith in the
system, because false pleas remain largely invisible to public scrutiny.230
Second, little concern exists over real perpetrators escaping punishment.
Police and prosecutors do not commonly pursue other suspects once a defendant
wins acquittal. Remember, law enforcement officials arrest and prosecute wrongfully because they truly believe that innocent defendants are guilty.231 Accordingly, when prosecutors lose at trial, they do not then come to think that the defendant must have been innocent after all; they think that the defendant got
away with it. Moreover, many innocent defendants are innocent not because
they did not commit the crime, but because no crime in fact was committed. This
See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 15-16 (1998); see generally Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and
Punishment in America 28-31 (1995).
228 See supra note 191, infra notes 246-253, and accompanying text.
229 See CASPER, supra note 58, at 49 (“[T]he participation hypothesis . . . suggests that a defendant, by participating in the decision about what sentence he is to receive, will find the sentence and the whole proceeding more palatable.”). But cf. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE
LAW 31-37, 64-69, 161-62 (1990) (finding that defendants’ perceptions of legitimacy are linked to
fair procedures, not outcomes). She may even recoup some personal vindication from what one
lawyer described as the “civil disobedience” of the false plea. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1306. I
am reminded of the grandfather’s deathbed admonition in Ralph Ellison’s INVISIBLE MAN: “I have
been a traitor all my born days . . . . [O]vercome ‘em with yeses, undermine ‘em with grins, agree
‘em to death and destruction, let ‘em swoller you till they vomit or bust wide open.” RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 32 (2d. vintage ed. 1995).
230 Of course, the innocent defendant’s immediate community of family and friends may know
of (or believe in) the defendant’s innocence. But they are as likely to be in favor of the guilty plea
as the innocent defendant. They, too, may see it as the least evil. And, like the innocent defendant, if they harbor any systemic disillusions, these disillusions flow most directly from the policing and screening processes that led to the initial wrongful arrest and charge. See Bowers, supra
note 54.
231 See Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 1970 (“Innocent persons are accused not because prosecutors are wicked but because these innocents appear to be guilty.”).
227
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is particularly true of recidivist innocent defendants facing petty charges. Petty
charges often stem from police observation of supposed crime, not police investigation of crime reports.232 If the defendant is innocent, it is frequently because
the police saw something and wrongly assumed that it was criminal.233
The weightiest objections are the third and fourth—that plea bargaining for
innocent defendants incentivizes prosecutorial decisions to charge and enables
police misconduct. However, both concerns are endemic to plea-bargaining more
generally. With respect to prosecutors’ charging decisions, the argument is that
in a world without plea bargaining—and keeping resources stable—prosecutors
would be forced to take more cases to trial and therefore would be more circumspect in their charging decisions.234 This may or may not be true. Professors
Scott and Stuntz offered this equally persuasive counter: “[A] cheaper trial process [necessitated by increased trial frequency] would make more [mistakes]. The
combination of higher error rate and lower cost per trial would substantially reduce the cost to a prosecutor of getting a case wrong. . . . That adds up to a reduced incentive to separate the innocent from the guilty.”235
In any event, the problem is not substantially worsened by the addition to
the mix of rare innocent defendants. Because most defendants are guilty in fact,
and the overwhelming majority pleads guilty, the prosecutorial impulse to charge
remains strong even if a few innocent defendants are forced to trial. Moreover,
the defendant knows he is innocent, but the prosecutor ex ante does not. And the
prosecutor resists innocence signals.236 This information asymmetry calls into
question any confidence that greater attention to charging discretion would lead
prosecutors to weed out cases against the innocent, as opposed to the guilty.
Admittedly, it could be the case that prosecutors would dismiss weak cases
(which innocent defendants are more likely to face).237 However, it is even more
likely that prosecutors would choose to charge recidivists (who are more likely to
be innocent).238 In the end, prosecutors would probably weed out cases against
clean-record defendants or cases in which witness cooperation was question-

See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1819-21 (1998)
(describing how police enforcement of vice crimes—and street-crime prevention generally—is prospective; police go looking for crime).
233 Trespassing is the clearest example. Usually, if the defendant is innocent, it is because
she had permission to be at the location, not because another trespassed.
234 See Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note 1, at 2007.
235 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 55, at 2013.
236 See infra notes 32-34, 38-51, 179 and accompanying text. Because guilty defendants copy
innocent defendant’s signals, permitting the innocent to plea bargain may increase deterrence for
another reason: on balance, it produces greater increases in conviction of the guilty than the innocent, because most defendants who proclaim innocence are in fact guilty. See Church, supra note
5, at 518-519.
237 Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note 1, at 2007.
238 See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
232
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able—both of which are categories that are largely unreflective of (or even cut
against) innocence.239
With respect to enabling police misconduct, the argument is that the exclusionary rule is the principal tool for combating that particular ill, but guilty pleas
forestall the check.240 But suppression hearings already are ineffective as a safeguard against police misconduct because so few cases ever get to that point.241
Moreover, for the few cases that ripen to substantive hearings, there are strong
reasons to doubt the efficacy of the exclusionary rule in policing the police.
Judges are especially loath to discredit even incredible police testimony if it
means razing evidence against defendants—especially recidivist defendants—
who judges may already believe are wasting judicial resources by not plea bargaining.242 In short, the impact of permitting innocent defendants to plea bargain is a mere drop in a very large and full bucket. Instead, the problem is best
addressed by instituting innovative alternative safeguards against police misconduct243 or by limiting plea bargaining for the guilty and the innocent alike.244
As to all these concerns, perhaps the best response is that the innocent defendant seems a strange agent of social reform.245 By obliging her to forego a
plea, she is forced to internalize all costs and risks for diffuse and somewhat abstract public benefit.246 Certainly, evils like police misconduct disproportionately
impact poor and minority communities. But the most common innocent defendants—recidivists facing petty charges—often come from these very communities.

See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text; see generally Scott Baker, Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 149 (2001).
240 See Zeidman, supra note 226, at 324-33
241 See id. at 332 (“[A] slew of guilty pleas . . . serve to insulate police practice from scrutiny.”); infra sources at note 70 (noting that half of all New York City cases are disposed of at the
first appearance and the overwhelming majority are disposed of within months).
242 See COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTICORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMISSION REPORT 1994, at
42 (“[T]he tolerance the criminal justice system exhibits takes the form of a lesser level of scrutiny when it comes to police officers’ testimony. Fewer questions are asked; weaker explanations
are accepted.”), available at
http://www.parc.info/reports/pdf/mollenreport.pdf [hereinafter MOLLEN REPORT].
243 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422 (1971) (Burger,
J., dissenting) (proposing “administrative or quasi-judicial remedy against the government itself
to afford compensation and restitution for persons whose Fourth Amendment rights have been
violated.”); see generally Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An
Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937 (1983).
244 See Zeidman, supra note 226, at 332-33.
245 Cf. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A
Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. L. F. 197, 208 (1998) (discussing “burden sharing”).
246 Cf. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 55, at 2013 (“[Forcing the innocent to trial] stands every
known notion of distributional justice on its head. . . . [L]osses, especially, unjust losses, are better spread than concentrated.”).
239
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And they are not well served by compulsory trials.247 Accordingly, any societal
benefit can be realized only by discounting the preferences of inculpable defendants (from vulnerable communities) who least deserve the added burdens.248
Ultimately, a system that respects the autonomy of the guilty to forfeit trial
rights should respect the autonomy of the innocent to do the same.249 Indeed,
autonomy is a persuasive counterweight to constitutional objections to bargaining’s trial penalties: “[T]he defendants who pay the heaviest penalties under the
current regime—defendants who refuse to bargain, go to trial, and are convicted—at least have the option, ex ante, of taking a different course of action.”250
Innocent defendants should have the same option.
When an innocent defendant rationally chooses to plead guilty, the system
should want to protect access. It should recognize that at least for the innocent
defendant it is not bad that some deals are not just sensible, they would be improvident to reject. Particularly where process costs are high and the consequences of conviction low, a bargained-for conviction of an innocent accused is no
evil, it is the constructive minimization thereof—an unpleasant medicine softening the symptoms of separate affliction.251 This is the best response to Professor
Schulhofer, a leading critic, who highlighted a “strong social policy against punishing the innocent” and noted that “there is no comparable social policy against
inconveniencing an innocent (for example, by requiring him to stand trial), if reducing his welfare in this way would benefit others.”252 From this reasoning,
Schulhofer concluded that the system is normatively required to “protect inno-

247 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1928 (“[A]bolishing plea bargaining only worsens this
situation. Poor people are indeed disadvantaged in the criminal process relative to rich people,
but the relative disadvantage increases when trials are required.”); cf. supra notes 174-179 and
accompanying text (arguing that clients of self-dealing attorneys are better off plea bargaining).
248 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 55, at 2013; Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 320.
249 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1913, 1935; Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 1976
(“Why is liberty too important to be left to the defendant whose life is at stake? Should we not
say instead that liberty is too important to deny effect to the defendant’s choice.”); Zacharias, supra note 113, at 1136, 1143; Charles Smith, Equivocal Guilty Pleas—Should They Be Accepted, 75
DICK L. REV. 366, 371 (1975) (“[A]n innocent man who asks for punishment may be foolish, but if
he thinks the bargain is good, no injustice results from punishing him for his will is done”).
250 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1935; see also CASPER, supra note 58, at 50 (“The defendant, if he does not like the bargain, may reject it and stand trial. If he accepts the bargain, he
cannot help but feel that his sentence is something that he consented to and participated in bringing about, even if at the same time he resents the process.”); supra notes 58, 229 and accompanying text (discussing participation as reason that defendants prefer guilty pleas to trials).
251 Cf. Leipold, supra note 33, at 1301 (“For an innocent suspect charged with a crime, there
are only two possible outcomes: bad and really bad.”).
252 Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note 1, at 1986 (emphasis in original); accord Hessick & Saujani, supra note 162 at 241 (noting that innocent defendant’s choice to plead guilty may be “rational from his private perspective,” but such private choice is of no consequence where it “imposes costs on society by undermining public confidence”); see also Bibas, supra note 1, at 138688.
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cents from the pressure (or temptation) of extremely lenient plea offers.”253 But
he drew too fine a line: the typical recidivist innocent defendant—facing petty
charges and perhaps detained pretrial—would find no practical distinction between punishment and trial inconvenience and no solace in systemic protections
against leniency.
VII. FOR FALSE PLEAS
Finally, I turn to the means of guaranteeing innocent defendants’ access to
guilty pleas and plea bargaining’s full benefits. I first address why current options are insufficient and then propose a new solution: reconstructing false words
of guilt as accepted legal fiction.
A. Nolo Contendere and Alford Pleas: Non-Solutions
At common law, defendants could enter pleas of nolo contendere to misdemeanor charges and thereby accept conviction of guilt without making express
admissions.254 Presently, some jurisdictions have extended nolo contendere pleas
to certain felony charges, but, in the main, the practice is reserved for minor offenses.255 Separately, the Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Alford formulated
an additional vehicle for rational-choice pleas—available theoretically in cases of
all degrees of seriousness.256 In Alford, the Court held constitutional equivocal
pleas where defendants plead guilty while concurrently maintaining innocence—
so long as the plea constitutes “a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action.”257
Many scholars oppose both types of pleas—singling out Alford pleas for especially pointed derision—as cynical instruments that sacrifice accuracy, process,
and substantive communal values for the questionable good of efficient punishment and purported voluntary choice.258 Others favor the pleas as evils neces-

Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note 1, at 2004-05.
See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1370-71; Neil H. Cogan, Entering Judgment on a Plea of Nolo
Contendere: A Reexamination of North Carolina v. Alford and Some Thoughts on the Relationship
Between Proof and Punishment, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 992, 993 (1975)
255 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1370-71; Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1291; see also Hudson v.
United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926) (holding valid nolo contendere pleas for federal charges that
carry potential prison sentences). Of the 1,683 federal defendants who pled nolo contendere between 1997 and 2001, 90% were charged with misdemeanor or petty offenses and more than half
were charged with traffic offenses. Leipold, supra note 23, at 1156 & n.172.
256 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
257 Id. at 31, 37.
258 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1382; Hessick & Saujani, supra note 162, at 197.
253
254
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sary to allow the innocent the option to plead guilty with a measure of honesty.259
Both sides miss the mark. Alford and nolo contendere pleas are faulty not because they promote inaccurate conviction, but rather because they do not make
voluntary pleas for the innocent available or useful enough.
First, both types of plea are inconsistently available. The nolo contendere
plea is available by statute only in certain jurisdictions and for certain types of
crimes.260 The Alford plea is even less frequently available. In formulating the
Alford doctrine, the Supreme Court gave lower courts broad discretion whether to
accept the plea at all.261 Ultimately, for both plea types, final say over availability is left not to defendants, but to state legislatures, court systems, or the individual vagaries of lawyers and judges. For example, some states adopt blanket
bans against nolo contendere and/or Alford pleas.262 Others leave the decision to
the individual judge, who exercises almost absolute discretion.263 Even where a
particular judge permits the pleas, prosecutors still may resist.264 Indeed, the
Department of Justice has expressly discouraged its assistants from offering Alford pleas.265 And many offices require supervisory approval before assistants
may acquiesce.266 Finally, even defense attorneys—out of professional discom259 Alschuler, Swallowing Camels, supra note 6, at 412-424; Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1292,
1296-98; Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 320, Curtis J. Shipley, Note, The Alford Plea: A Necessary
but Unpredictable Tool for the Criminal Defendant, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1073 (1987).
260 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1370-71, 79-80; supra notes 254-255 and accompanying text.
261 400 U.S. at 38 n. 11 (“Our holding does not mean that a trial judge must accept every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely because a defendant wishes so to plead. A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by
the court. . . . States may bar their courts from accepting guilty pleas from any defendants who
assert their innocence.”).
262 Eisenberg v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 86 Pa. Commw. 358, 363, 485 A.2d
511, 514 (1984) (noting that Pennsylvania does not recognize Alford pleas); State v. Korzenowski,
123 N.J. Super. 454, 456 n.1, 303 A.2d 596, 597 n.1 (App. Div) (affirming state court directive to
reject Alford pleas), cert. denied, 63 N.J. 327, 307 A.2d 100 (1973); Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420,
423 (Ind. 1983) (holding that Indiana does not recognize Alford pleas). Presently, thirty-eight
states and the federal system allow nolo contendere pleas in at least some types of cases, and
forty-seven states and the federal system theoretically allow Alford pleas. Bibas, supra note 1, at
1370-71. However, far fewer states have actually applied the Alford doctrine. See Hessick & Saujani, supra note 162, at 198.
263 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1379-80; Barkai, supra note 1, at 123-24 (“[T]he rejection of an
equivocal plea falls in the vast area of district court discretion that is virtually unreviewable.”);
see, e.g., United States v. Melendez-Salas, 466 U.S. 861 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding no abuse of discretion for judge’s refusal of plea); State v. Knutson, 523 P.2d 967 (Wash. 1974) (same); State v.
Brumfield, 14 Or. App. 273 274-76, 511 P.2d 1256, 1257-58 (1973) (same); see also Shipley, supra
note 259, at 1068 n. 58 (“[M]ost judges remain leery of Alford pleas and accept the Supreme
Court’s invitation to reject them.”). Contra United States v. Gaskins, 485 F.2d 1046, 1049 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (finding abuse where court based refusal of plea solely on defendant’s denial of guilt).
264 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1379-1380, 1386.
265 See id.
266 See, e.g., DOJ, Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 34, at § 9-16.015; see also Hessick & Saujani, supra note 162, at 198.
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fort—may opt not to pursue or participate in Alford pleas.267 This broad opposition to both pleas—the Alford plea especially—is most likely a product of queasiness for practices that offend core values that institutional actors like to believe
the system prizes.268 The result is arbitrary availability; some equivocating defendants may plead, but most may not.269 Consequently, Alford has developed
into a doctrine applied by “judicial whim” that is “subject to no restrictions and
no standards,” where in essence “defendants have no rights and trial courts can
do no wrong.”270 And nolo contendere pleas are relegated by history and practice
to only limited classes of cases in limited jurisdictions.271
Second, both types of plea fail to provide defendants the full benefits of their
bargains. Instead, defendants may suffer multiple detrimental sentencing and
corollary consequences for entering pleas without admitting guilt. For example,
if defendants have entered into charge bargains with open sentences, judges may
increase sentences toward the statutory maximum for lack of contrition.272 Additionally, defendants often are required to make factual admissions to the crimes
of conviction in order to secure release on parole, to minimize grading under the
Sex Offender Registration Act, and to complete successfully probation and/or
treatment programs.273 Finally, prosecutors that choose to accept the pleas may
demand a higher sanction as the quid pro quo price of acquiescence.274

267 See HALL, supra note 222, at § 15:10 (noting that defense attorney has professional discretion to pursue or forgo Alford pleas); see, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Tillman v. Alldredge, 350 F. Supp. 189
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding not ineffective counsel’s failure to pursue plea bargaining where defendant maintained innocence); see also infra notes 293-294 (discussing perceived ethical problem of
guilty pleas for innocent, and citing sources that would prohibit or make discretionary defense
attorneys’ involvement in such pleas).
268 See UVILLER, supra note 2, at 196; Givelber, supra note 32, at 1172 (“Believing that those
charged are guilty also operates as a balm upon the conscience of those who administer criminal
justice in our society. No one wants to participate in a practice that they believe routinely imprisons the innocent.”); Bibas, supra note 1, at 1379-81; Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1304 (“The
refusal of most trial judges to accept Alford pleas is probably attributable in part to their personal
conviction that these pleas are improper.”).
269 See Shipley, supra note 259, at 1064, 1068 (describing Alford’s application as “haphazard .
. . unpredictable” and as “a rarity”); Barkai, supra note 1, at 125 (describing use and impact of
Alford in federal system to be “very limited”). But see Bibas, supra note 1, at 1375 (noting more
frequent usage).
270 Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1301.
271 See supra notes 254-255, 260 and accompanying text.
272 See Bryan H. Ward, A Plea Best Not Taken: Why Criminal Defendants Should Avoid the
Alford Plea, 68 MO. L. REV. 913, 921-26 (2003) (citing cases where courts took lack of remorse into
account to increase sentences after Alford pleas); Leipold, supra note 23, at 1157-58.
273 See Ward, supra note 272, at 926-35 (citing cases where Alford pleas produced defendantnegative parole, probation, and sex-offender consequences).
274 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1378 n.81. This is especially true for nolo contendere pleas
that (at least in theory) cannot be used as evidence in future civil suits. See RONALD WRIGHT &
MARC MILLER, 1 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 177 (1973). Prosecutors justifiably may
view this benefit as requiring a corresponding defense concession.
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Third, with respect only to Alford pleas, these pleas raise genuine concern
over conviction—not of the innocent—but of defendants who do not, in fact, wish
to plead at all. At bottom, equivocation is an imprecise check for the possibility
that an innocent defendant is pleading guilty falsely. It is a far more accurate
check for the possibility that a defendant is pleading involuntarily—a separate
(and constitutional) concern.275 Defendants who equivocate generally do so because they are unsure that the guilty plea is the right course of action.276 Their
hesitation signals that something is amiss—that they do not view pleading as the
best option, even if it is.277 A particular defendant might demur precisely because she is innocent (or believes herself to be) or for wholly different reasons.
Regardless, a court should not deem such a plea voluntary.278 Moreover, to the
extent concerns exist of imperfect agency—that domineering defense lawyers
might force unwilling defendants to plead—then permitting equivocal pleas
seems a particularly poor idea. The equivocating defendant is of two minds; a
necessary question is which is hers and which is her lawyer’s. Conversely, a defendant who very much wants a bargain would seem most ready to voice words of
guilt—true or not—that makes the bargain happen fluidly. When defense counsel explains that asking for an Alford plea might complicate matters, a willing
defendant generally protests no further.279 Those innocent defendants that are
voluntarily pleading guilty rationally recognize—for reasons of process-cost
avoidance or concern over trial penalties—that swallowing pride and stating guilt
on the record are the smoothest roads forward.

See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (holding that pleas are constitutionally
required to be knowing and voluntary).
276 See Smith, supra note 249, at 374 (“By his equivocation, the pleader has signaled his dissatisfaction with the bargain, or at the very least, his latent unwillingness to make it.”).
277 Accordingly, the pleas are prime fodder for appellate challenge. See Bibas, supra note 1,
at 1379.
278 See Smith, supra note 249, at 374-75. The facts of Alford are instructive on this point.
The defendant tried to withdraw his plea as involuntary, because, among other reasons, he had
contested his guilt and the court had disregarded his protestations. The plea transcript hints at
involuntariness: “[Y]ou all got me to plead guilty. . . . You told me to plead guilty, right. I don’t—
I’m not guilty but I plead guilty.” 400 U.S. at 28 n.2. It seems at least plausible that the defendant was about to say: “I don’t—want to plead.” Cf. Ward, supra note 272, at 917 (2003) (“Defense attorneys should keep in mind that the Alford plea was not a fundamental right wrested
from an unwilling prosecution, but rather was a means by which the prosecution was able to retain a questionable plea of guilty.”).
279 See Smith, supra note 249, at 374 (“[A] truly innocent, rational man, who, for his own reasons, chooses to ‘take the rap’ is least likely of all to tergiversate when pleading. . . . Indeed, it
may well be that chief among the equivocators are the merely reluctant guilty and the dissemblers.”); see also UVILLER, supra note 2, at 195 (“[I]nnocent defendants . . . say[] what [i]s required
to get the bargain plea they want[].”); Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1305 (noting that defense attorneys sometimes counsel clients to get “lines right”); Kuh, supra note 194, at 500 (noting that defendants just “mouth” the prearranged words “whether or not they are truthful”); cf. Bibas supra
note 1, at 1378 nn.81,87.
275

47

Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2008)

B. False Pleas: The Solution
Criminal law—like most all law—consists of a collection of accepted fictions.280 For example, defendants are considered to have constructive knowledge
of statutory text and meaning.281 Defendants are presumed innocent, notwithstanding the mathematical certainty that they are more likely culprits that any
other person present in the courtroom.282 Fictions permeate even the bargaining
process: In many jurisdictions, defendants must concur on the record that no
promises were made in exchange for their pleas even though bargains clearly
were struck.283 And courts premise guilty-plea discounts on a dubious contrition,
claimed inherent in the acceptance of even bargained-for deals.284 Even certain
discrete breeds of false defendant-testimony are acceptable. Defendants must
verbally state “not guilty” at arraignments—even when they most certainly are—
in order to push a case on to trial.285 Courts have allowed defendants to plead
guilty to daytime burglaries to satisfy lesser charges, even when the crimes indisputably occurred in dark of night.286 Courts have upheld pleas to “hypothetical crimes” that exist in no penal code and require impossible mens rea.287 All of
these falsehoods generally muster little objection, because they are “recognized as
having utility”—Professor Lon Fuller’s paradigmatic definition of legal fictions.288
See H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ‘AS IF’ 34 (1935) (“In the fictio juris, . . . something
that has not happened is regarded as having happened, or vice versa . . . . Roman law is permeated throughout by such fictions, and in modern countries . . . juristic fictions have undergone
additional development.”).
281 See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 886
(2004).
282 See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1370-71 (1971).
283 See Kuh, supra note 194, at 500.
284 UVILLER, supra note 2, at 183 (noting that judges accept the premise of contrition “with a
straight face”); Kuh, supra note 194, at 500 (noting guilty plea’s “fiction of ‘remorse’”).
285 See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., “How Do You Plead, Guilty or Not Guilty?”: Does the Plea Inquiry Violate the Defendant’s Right to Silence?, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1409, 1411 (2005) (“What is for
lawyers and judges a casually used term-of-art is viewed by ordinary people as a serious moral
claim by the defendant that he did not commit the crime. In order to make the state prove its
case, the defendant must make a false statement.”).
286 The frequency of such factual reinvention led one police officer to complain: “You’d think
all burglaries were committed in Detroit at high noon.” BOND, supra note 217, at 3-112; see also
Stuntz, supra note 120, at 2557 (noting the prevalence in federal cases of ‘fact bargaining’ over
quantity of possessed drugs); Colquitt, supra note 183, at 740-41 (collecting similar cases).
287 See e.g., People v. Castro, 44 A.D.2d 808 (1974), aff’d, 37 N.Y.2d 818 (1975) (“[A] defendant may plead to a crime which does not exist and the plea is valid. Such a hypothetical crime
has no elements, yet their absence does not affect the plea.”); People v. Israel, 335 N.E.2d 53 (Ill.
1975) (upholding plea to nonexistent lesser charge of attempted voluntary manslaughter); see also
BOND, supra note 217, at 3-112 (“Occasionally a defendant will plead guilty to an offense that
doesn’t exist . . . . Such pleas are always bargained, and courts generally sustain their validity.”);
Colquitt, supra note 183, at 712, 740-41 (collecting cases).
288 LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967).
280
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The puzzle is why the system draws the line on the ultimate question of culpability.289 False pleas are only less truthful than these other fictions by degree.
A defendant who pleads to a factually impossible crime could not have committed
it—just as when an innocent defendant pleads to a genuine crime. The answer to
the puzzle lies elsewhere then: the system accepts pleas to hypothetical or incoherent charges because the defendant still admits truthfully that she did “something wrong.” The system authorizes all kinds of expedient falsehood, but stops
short at lies that cut against blameworthiness. Rather, it finds something sacrosanct and inviolable—even magical—in the bottom-line accuracy of the defendant’s admission that he behaved (in some fashion) illegally.290 Institutional actors (who should know better) hold on to this last vestige of an antiquated truthseeking ideal.291 Accordingly, ethics materials on the topic of false pleas for the
innocent almost uniformly condemn—or at least frown upon—the defense practice of allowing or assisting an innocent defendant to plead guilty.292 And the

See supra note 222, infra notes 292-294, 303-308, and accompanying text.
Cf. Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
757 (1988) (“[A] theme runs consistently through the cases. Pleas of guilty are ‘grave and solemn’
acts that are valid because they represent ‘the defendant's admission in open court that he committed the acts charged.’” (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970))); David L.
Shapiro, Should A Guilty Plea Have Preclusive Effect, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27, 35 (1984) (“[T]he argument runs . . . that acceptance of a guilty plea is really a far more solemn and significant event.
. . . [S]ociety has an interest in insuring that only the guilty are convicted and punished. Thus, a
guilty plea, once accepted, comes closer to an adjudication of fact.”).
291 See infra notes 295-296 and accompanying text.
292 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 222, at Standard 14-1.6 Cmt. (noting that innocent defendants should not plead guilty); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Section 5.3 (1970) (“If the accused discloses to the
lawyer facts which negate guilt and the lawyer’s investigation does not reveal a conflict with the
facts disclosed but the accused persists in entering a plea of guilty, the lawyer may not properly
participate in presenting a guilty plea, without disclosure to the court.”); AMSTERDAM, supra note
163, at 363 (leaving the decision to lawyer’s “individual conscience” and noting that even when a
plea bargain is “distinctly to the client’s best advantage,” a “hard decision follows”); HALL, supra
note 222, at § 15:10 (“There is . . . no ethical or constitutional duty on counsel to negotiate a plea
for the defendant who insists on his or her innocence.”); Warren E. Burger, Standards of Conduct
for Prosecution and Defense Personnel, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 15 (1966); see also Douglas A. Copeland, Missouri’s Public Defender System, 62 J. MO. B. 10 (2006); Major Bradley J. Huestis, New
Developments in Pretrial Procedures: Evolution or Revolution, 2002 ARMY LAW. 20, 30 (2002)
(“The military accused may not plead guilty unless he honestly and reasonably believes he is
guilty.”); Jack B. Zimmermann, The Lawyer’s Duty to Promote the Common Good, 40 S. TEX. L.
REV. 227, 228 (1999) (“[I]t borders on unethical conduct by a lawyer to participate in a plea of
guilty by a client who in fact is not guilty. . . . [F]or a lawyer to stand silent while the innocent
defendant lies to the judge (falsely confessing guilt) is to perpetuate a fraud on the court. . . . I
have learned [this] through service as a prosecutor, defense lawyer, and criminal trial judge.”);
Bradley, supra note 222, at 77; supra note 222 and accompanying text (citing sources that insist
that innocent should not plead guilty); see generally Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1280-89, 96-1306
(discussing potential ethical problem and defense attorneys’ ethical concerns).
289
290

49

Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2008)

limited case law on the question has held likewise.293 Indeed, no less respected
an authority than Warren Burger has declared the practice unethical: “When an
accused tells the court he committed the act charged to induce acceptance of the
guilty plea, the lawyer to whom contrary statements have been made owes a duty
to the court to disclose such contrary statements so the court can explore and resolve the conflict.”294
I have demonstrated, I hope, that blameworthiness does not deserve the import ascribed to it. And righteous judicial pronouncements to the contrary only
demonstrate “how easily judges—even wise and sophisticated judges—come to
believe in the forms and trappings of their own rituals.”295 Ultimately, there exists a marked disconnect between systemic fact and hollow ideals when it comes
to guilt and innocence. The fact is that the criminal justice system no longer has
much to do with transparent adversarial truth-seeking; it has far more to do with
the opaque processing of (rightful or wrongful) recent arrests.296 Guilty pleas are
thus no more than sterile administrative procedures, and plea bargaining is the
mere mechanism that ensures that these procedures are carried out efficiently.297
Administrative procedures, of course, possess no magic or endogenous moral
value; they are at most pragmatic. Accordingly, there is nothing left that is sacrosanct about admissions, and there is no good reason to act in deference to
empty principles that ignore the realities of punishment and serve no practical
purpose other than shuttling the undeserving innocent into compelled unwelcome
process or risk of trial penalties. At bottom, all that recommends prohibition of
false pleas is visceral distaste. And that is not enough.
Conversely, there is much to recommend false pleas: they allow innocent defendants to receive the same bargaining and pleading benefits as the guilty; they
ensure that pleas are limited to the voluntary innocent (to only those so eager to
Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 119 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“We have no hesitation in
saying that an attorney, an officer of the court, may not counsel or practice such a deliberate deception [as permitting the defendant] . . . state[] facts that show he is guilty . . . departing from
truth if need be.”); United States v. Rogers¸ 289 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1968) (noting that it is
“utterly unreasonable for counsel to recommend a guilty plea to a defendant without first cautioning him that, no matter what, he should not plead guilty unless he believed himself guilty.”); People v. Butler, 43 Mich. App. 270, 280-81, 204 N.W.2d 325, 330 (1972); supra note 222 and accompanying text. Even the Supreme Court has expressed a will to limit pleas to the factually guilty
only. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (requiring factual basis before court can take
equivocal plea); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (“We would have serious doubts
about this case if the encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased
the likelihood that defendants . . . would falsely condemn themselves.”); Corbitt v. New Jersey,
439 U.S. 212, 225 (1978).
294 Burger, supra note 292, at 15.
295 UVILLER, supra note 2, at 196; cf. supra sources at note 268.
296 See supra Parts I-V.
297 See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 912-22 (2006) (arguing that, contrary to its history, American criminal justice has become the exclusive province of professional insiders who depend on “[s]wift dispositions” and “lowvisibility procedures” at the points of arrest, charge, and plea)
293
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plead guilty that they are willing to swallow principle and utter false words); and
presumably they promote judicial efficiency.298 Like all good legal fictions, false
admissions are just another means of bending law to promote “function, form,
and sometimes even fairness.”299
Admittedly, even without my proposal, plea bargaining for many innocent
defendants will proceed apace. Many judges and lawyers eagerly resist righteous
interdictions that might interfere with the welcome processing of pleas. 300 Accordingly, some defense attorneys currently counsel their innocent clients to
plead guilty—even when equivocal and no-contest pleas are unavailable.301 A
few might even already accept the practice as a quasi-legal fiction.302 But most
will not admit that sentiment in polite company. And some defense attorneys
take seriously their perceived responsibilities to ship innocent clients off to uncertain trials via costly process. For example, in United States v. Price, the deSee supra notes 260-279 and accompanying text.
Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871 (1986). By contrast, false testimony of innocence—of the kind condemned in Nix v. Whiteside, 457 U.S. 157 (1986)—serves no
recognizable systemic value.
300 See supra Part III.
301 See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1284-87, 1296, 1305-06 (interviewing defense attorneys).
Many defense attorneys make use of the convenient dodge that they cannot conclusively know
that clients are factually innocent. William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 1703, 1705 (1993); cf. Monroe H. Freedman, But Only if You Know, ETHICAL PROBLEMS
FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER: PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO TOUGH QUESTIONS 138 (Rodney
J. Uphoff ed. 1995) (discussing degree of knowledge of guilt necessary to trigger defense attorney’s ethical obligation to not suborn perjury). But there are some circumstances where knowledge of innocence is clear. For example, I represented several defendants charged with trespass
in buildings where they in fact lived or were lawfully visiting relatives. Occasionally, I would verify this defense to a substantial certainty, but the defendant would still plead because compelling
dismissal would require weeks of waiting. Similarly, I represented some defendants with alibi
defenses that were ironclad. A few of these defendants, facing petty cases, preferred immediate
disposition. See HEUMANN, supra note 11, at 73 (noting lawyer who hired psychiatrist to question
felony defendant under truth serum; defendant passed but took plea to fifty-dollar fine); Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1296 (quoting defense attorney: “I have entered guilty pleas for defendants whom I knew to be innocent. . . . Year after year, these [repeat] clients would . . . ‘level’
without hesitation. Then they would come . . . and say, ‘It’s a bum rap this time.’ There would be
no reason . . . to lie; the case would be like all the others.”); cf. Simon, supra, at 1706 (“To conclude
that [defense counsel] ‘knows’ these things, we do not have to attribute any cosmic, preHeisenbergian certainty to her.”).
302 See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1306 (quoting defense attorney’s claim that admission of
guilt is “a fiction, like Nevada domicile in a divorce action”); c.f. United States v. Rogers, 289 F.
Supp. 726, 729 (D. Conn. 1968) (finding “utterly unreasonable” defense counsel’s advice that client should only plead guilty if he believes himself to be guilty); State v. Kaufman, 51 Ia. 578, 580
(1879) (“Reasons other than the fact that he is guilty may induce a defendant to so plead . . . and
the right of the defendant to so plead has never been doubted.”). It would seem that Professor
Alschuler and Judge Easterbrook fall squarely in this camp. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1300
n.328 (“Why the problem of the ‘innocent’ defendant . . . [is] viewed primarily as an ethical problem . . . is somewhat mystifying. Apparently guilty pleas were once viewed unquestionably as
factual confessions to the court . . . [but presently] it might be proper to employ the ‘guilty-plea
strategy’ . . . [and the] ‘ethical problem’ largely disappears.”); Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 320.
298
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fense attorney indicated on the record that he would not allow his client to plead
guilty: “He tells me he didn’t do it. I told him that under those circumstances, I
can’t proffer the plea to the court.”303 Likewise, Professor Alschuler interviewed
several prosecutors and defense attorneys who categorically refused to permit or
participate in plea bargaining or guilty pleas for the innocent.304 Some of these
defense attorneys indicated that their offices had policies expressly proscribing
the practice.305 And one senior public defender noted that in his office, lawyers
would withdraw typically from cases if they believed innocent clients wished to
plead guilty falsely.306 Additionally, judges often warn clients not to plead guilty
unless they are guilty in fact.307
In such a climate, even those defense attorneys who would otherwise see fit
to counsel false pleas may do so only with great professional discomfort—
speaking in hushed tones for fear of disapproval, interference, or worse, discipline.308 Consequently, my proposal would have value even if most innocent de-

436 F.2d 303, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1280-89, 1296-1301; see also Glatt v. Johnson, 2001 WL 432355
(N.D. Tex. 2001) (noting favorably defense lawyer’s practice of advising clients “not to plead guilty
unless they are guilty”); Mitchell, supra note 162, at 320-21 (lauding public defender office where
“almost no defendants who protested their innocence (and there were many), whether out on bail
or not, pled guilty”); Mills, supra note 126, at 61-62 (quoting discussion between defense lawyer
and detained client in which defense lawyer refused to let client plead unless he stopped privately
insisting on innocence); Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 841, 905 (1998) (“There are defense attorneys who believe that once a client asserts innocence, professional ethics or individual morality render plea
discussions inappropriate.”); supra note 222 and accompanying text (citing several attorneys that
insist that innocent should not plead guilty).
305 Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1280-89.
306 Id. at 1285-86.
307 See, e.g., Frederick v. Warden, 308 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2002); Pursley v. United States, 391
F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968) (“You cannot plead guilty unless you are actually guilty.”); Stone v.
United States, 1999 WL 325406 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); Mosley v. United States, 1995 WL 118180
(N.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Messimer, 598 F.Supp. 992 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Cobb v. State, 895
So.2d 1044 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); United States v. Chaney, 2006 WL 2843492 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 2006) (“If you don’t believe that you’re guilty, you should not plead guilty for any reason.”).
308 I practiced in front of certain judges—admittedly a minority—who would foreclose plea
bargaining that too closely followed prior on- or even off-the-record innocence claims. One judge
in particular bore especial hostility to the prospect of rational-choice pleas. He loudly denounced
the un-professionalism of any lawyer who he felt was advancing a guilty plea for a defendant with
a strong claim of innocence. He would even sometimes offer the unhelpful and possibly untrue
on-the-record promise to pleading defendants, in sum and substance: “If you are innocent, go to
trial, you will be acquitted.” Cf. Givelber, supra note 1, at 1396 (“[A] defendant against whom the
government is prepared to proceed to trial is convictable, even if innocent.”). Likewise, I encountered a few prosecutors and defense attorneys—particularly the new and unassimilated—who
would draw similar fine lines against pleas for those who proclaimed innocence. See generally
Heumann 47-152 (describing adaptation process whereby new judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys gradually abandon traditional adversarial roles). I observed the same at the federal
level. As an associate at a boutique white-collar defense firm, I sat in on a ludicrous hours-long
303
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fendants who wish to plead guilty do so already as part of underground practice.
My proposal would strengthen the argument for scrapping the ineffective and
problematic nolo contendere and Alford doctrines. More than that, my proposal
would provide much-needed guidance to systemic actors. By embracing dishonest
pleas, the proposal might even (perhaps counter-intuitively) promote a healthy
kind of institutional honesty, visible only to criminal-justice functionaries (who
trade in legal fictions and should be allowed to know what does and does not
qualify), and necessarily invisible to a citizenry that benefits from the permanency of its truth-seeking illusions.309
The false plea would become just another sound legal tactic over which defense attorneys may entertain no professional qualm. Rather, they would be
obliged to assist in such strategy—notwithstanding conflicting personal principles over appropriate systemic function. A lawyer who would refuse to advance
an accepted legal fiction would do no less than place her own self-interest above
her client’s. Zealous advocacy clearly requires more.310
What then are the nuts and bolts of my proposal? A weak version might just
involve abrogation of case law and official ethical instruction hindering innocent
defendants from plea bargaining or pleading guilty.311 Such ethical prescription
by silence runs the risk of doing very little to change the status quo. Many institutional actors would facilitate (at least quietly) plea bargaining and guilty pleas
for the innocent, a few others would not, and all would lack clear guidance. A
stronger version would speak positively, sanctioning plea bargaining for the innocent, declaring false pleas to be a legal fiction, and affirmatively requiring
counsel to advise clients about outstanding offers and to facilitate knowing and
voluntary client-decisions to plead. In essence, this would be no more than an
admonition to defense counsel to take seriously—even when clients profess innocence—the established rules that a lawyer (i) “should promptly communicate and
explain to the defendant all plea offers made by the prosecuting attorney,” (ii)
“should advise the defendant of the alternatives available,” (iii) “should use reasonable persuasion to guide the client to a sound decision,” and (iv) “should ensure that the decision whether to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is ultimately made by the defendant.”312 Open questions remain, of course, such as the
lawyer-client face-off where the partner refused to permit the client to plead guilty unless the client would stop privately protesting innocence and admit to having done “something wrong.”
309 See Bibas supra note 1, at 1363-64, 1386-88, 1403 n.215 (“[S]ociety has a strong interest in
ensuring that criminal convictions are both just and perceived as just. . . . Though many plea
bargains are less than honest . . . at least they do not proclaim this dishonesty or inconsistency
openly.”); cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“It is critical that the moral force of the
criminal law not be diluted by . . . [fears that] innocent men are being condemned.”); see generally
Bibas, supra note 297, at 912-22 (discussing how professional criminal-justice insiders operate out
of view of lay outsiders).
310 See infra notes 311-314 and accompanying text.
311 See, e.g., sources at notes 292-293, 312.
312 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 222, at Standard 14-3.2 & cmt. (3d ed. 1999); see also
AMSTERDAM, supra note 292, at 339. At present, courts do not always give these obligations their
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appropriate degree of “reasonable persuasion.”313 But it is probably enough to
leave such questions to the constraints of generalized ethical directives against
self-dealing.314
CONCLUSION
Innocent defendants fall into two very loose categories for plea bargaining
and guilty plea purposes: those for whom process costs should matter (read, defendants in low-stakes cases, particularly recidivists), and those for whom process
should matter (read, defendants in high-stakes cases, particularly recidivists).
In the former category, innocent defendants are plainly better off in a world
with plea-bargaining. Bargains provide these innocent defendants a means to
escape their own process costs and receive light un-maximized sentences, rather
than endure full process and risk considerable post-trial sanction. It is wholly
secondary whether the lenient offers are normatively good or bad systematically.
For the innocent accused, it is enough that they exist. Lenient offers create opportunities. A topmost normative demand should be to ensure that the innocent
have the same access to those opportunities. Of course, even an abbreviated sentence and any brand of conviction of the innocent is a systemic failure. But the
plea bargain is not the cause of this failure; the false arrest and the prosecutorial
decision to make and carry out charges are. And, although the offer may seem

due weight, especially when clients protest innocence. See, e.g., Guerrero v. United States, 383
F.3d 409, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding no prejudice by undisclosed offer because defendant protested innocence and therefore would not have accepted offer in any event); Purdy v. United
States, 208 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that no per se rule exists that counsel must advise a
client whether to plead guilty); U.S. ex rel. Tillman v. Alldredge, 350 F. Supp. 189, 195-96 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) (“I am not prepared to hold that an attorney who fails to explore the possibility of a plea
bargain on behalf of a client who insists that he is innocent, has represented his client ineffectively.”); State v. Powell, 578 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1998) (“Because of respondent’s insistence of his
innocence . . . and rejection of the first plea offer, counsel could have reasonably concluded that
additional discussion [with client about second plea offer] would have served no purpose.”); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 688 A.2d 1172, 1177 (Pa. 1997) (Castille, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“[M]y research reveals only one case . . . in which a federal court granted a writ of habeas
corpus based solely on a claim that trial counsel’s advice to reject a plea offer and proceed to trial
was ineffective.”).
313 The answer is no doubt case-specific. Admittedly, even light pressure on a client who proclaims innocence may strain attorney-client relations, but a good lawyer can provide effective
counsel tactfully. Especially where a plea is particularly favorable, defense counsel should not
abandon persuasion unless and until the defendant understands the jeopardy of soldiering on.
See AMSTERDAM, supra note 292, at 339 (“[O]ften counsel can protect the client from disaster only
by using a considerable amount of persuasion to convince the client that a plea which the client
instinctively disfavors is, in fact, in his or her best interest.”); Zeidman, supra note 304, at 905.
314 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 222, at Standard 14-3.2 cmt. (“It is, of course, unprofessional conduct for the lawyer intentionally to understate or overstate the risks, hazards, or
prospects of the case to exert undue influence on the accused’s decision as to his or her plea.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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foolhardy to decline, the defendant—innocent or guilty—always retains the right
to fight on for acquittal.
The question is pricklier in high-stakes cases. In these cases, all defendants—innocent and guilty—are better off in a world without plea bargaining, or,
at least, in a world with less plea-bargaining pressures. If prosecutors were unable to exploit over-inclusive criminal statutes to overcharge defendants, then
there would be far less concern over de facto trial penalties. Nevertheless, it does
not translate from this objection that innocent defendants should have no right to
plead guilty in serious felony cases. The innocent would be at great disadvantage
if the culpable could plead guilty to avoid large sentence disparities and rampant
overcharging, but the innocent could not. Innocent defendants—particularly recidivists facing habitual-offender statutes—would be obliged to bear all the risk,
but have no access to the benefits. The innocent defendant who wanted to plead
(but could not) would be forced to face the potential double injustice of, first,
wrongful arrest and charge, and, second, a post-trial sentence far lengthier than
the unavailable plea-bargain sentence. Worse still, because recidivists are the
most frequent innocent defendants and because trial biases make it particularly
difficult for them to fight charges, a guilty-plea bar would typically mandate trial
for the very type of innocent defendant least equipped to prevail.
The question of how to provide plea-bargaining access to the innocent is not
adequately answered by the faulty and inconsistently available Alford and nolo
contendere doctrines. The question should be answered instead by systemic recognition of false admissions as legal fictions. And defense attorneys should indulge no personal hesitation over such fictions where the plea is the innocent defendant’s voluntary choice and the manifest best option. When an innocent defendant wishes to minimize exposure either to horrific post-trial sentence or burdensome pretrial process that choice commands institutional respect.
There is no innocence problem—at least not with plea bargaining.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Josh Bowers
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
bowers@uchicago.edu
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